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The first chapter examines the long-run and short-run elasticity of income with 
respect to changes in tax rates. The Elasticity of Taxable Income (ETI) is a largely-
debated parameter in both research and policy. Despite the growing importance 
of ETI, the literature has not fully considered the intertemporal impacts of taxation. 
I expand the literature by estimating short-run and long-run impacts of tax rate 
changes relying on the most recent estimation method and using appropriate 
lagged values of income when constructing the predicted net-of-tax rate 
instruments. The short-run ETI in the baseline specification is 0.69 whereas 
estimates for the Elasticity of Broad Income (EBI) are much smaller and imprecise. 
The second chapter studies the impact of tax base on the elasticity of income. Most 
of the existing literature has appropriately used a constant definition of taxable 
income to focus on the effects of tax rate changes. It is important to recognize that 
a decrease in the tax base (in the form of a new deduction, exemption, or credit, 
for example) can create new opportunities for legal tax avoidance without altering 
real behavior. Using the most recent estimation method, I estimate the impact of 
tax base on the behavioral responses to taxation. Estimated results for the impact 
of tax base are much smaller than those in the existing literature. The third chapter 
examines the possible linkages between school choice and home values. I use 
home prices to draw inferences about households’ value for school choice, and a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for enrollment among four different types of 
schools as a proxy measure of school choice. I empirically test two hypotheses: 1) 
less concentrated counties will have less variability in home prices, 2) less 
concentrated counties will have higher median home prices. Based on county-level 
data, I find evidence that an increase in competition for enrollment is associated 
with a decrease in inequality of home prices within the county. Moreover, I find 
evidence of an overall increase in home prices within the counties following 
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Taxation creates a burden on individuals, causing behavioral changes and 
implying inefficiencies and distortions in the free market. Studying this behavioral 
response is vital in understanding the deadweight loss derived from taxation as 
well as in formulating optimal taxation. The current literature on the elasticity of 
taxable income (ETI) considers mostly short-run responses of changes in tax rates, 
and despite the growing importance of ETI for both research and policy, the 
literature has not fully considered the intertemporal impacts of taxation. The 
existing literature on the intertemporal impacts for changes in tax rates uses 
instruments for marginal net-of-tax rates1 constructed based on initial-year income. 
However, Weber (2014) shows that such instruments are endogenous. She 
addresses this concern by using appropriate lagged values of income when 
constructing the predicted marginal net-of-tax rate instruments. I apply the 
estimation method developed by Weber (2014) to estimate the intertemporal 
impacts of taxation. 
 
The ETI literature is vast. However, the recent literature on ETI mostly 
examines short-run responses. The specifications used to examine such short-run 
responses assume that taxpayers’ responses to taxation are immediate, which is 
a very strong assumption. The inherent nature of tax reform provides an 
opportunity for tax avoidance and adjustment of income across periods. In most 
cases there are large lags among the formulation of the draft proposal, enacting 
the tax reform and implementing it. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
(TRA86) was formulated in 1985, approved and signed into law in 1986 and finally 
implemented in 1987. Furthermore, phase-in and phase-out mechanisms also 
contribute to these lags, which enable the taxpayers to be aware of future changes 





1 Marginal net-of-tax rate is one minus marginal tax rate. 
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tax filers have an incentive to shift income between adjacent years to avoid taxes 
without altering longer-term real behavior. In such case, the magnitude of the 
short-run responses can be larger than that of the long-run responses. However, 
responses to tax changes can also take time. For instance, one might change 
his/her long-term investment decision in response to tax changes, or one might 
consider changing educational or career plan in response to tax changes. In such 
cases, short-run responses can be smaller than long-run responses. Therefore, 
the relative magnitude of short- and long-run responses can be ambiguous and is 
subject to empirical investigation. 
 
Giertz (2010) is one of the studies in the literature that examines intertemporal 
responses to tax changes. He follows the conventional literature by using 
instruments for marginal net-of-tax rates constructed based on base-year income.  
However, the recent literature has shown that the use of conventional instruments 
constructed using base-year income does not guarantee the exogeneity of the 
instruments, and therefore it is very unlikely that the estimates presented by Giertz 
(2010) are unbiased estimates of ETI. Utilizing the variation created by TRA86, I 
extend the literature by investigating the intertemporal behavioral responses and 
thereby separating the transient responses from the permanent responses to 
marginal tax rate changes using a more recently developed estimation method that 
addresses the endogeneity of the instruments due to mean reversion. I discuss 
mean reversion in the following section. Results are sensitive to specifications and 
provide some weak evidence for intertemporal adjustment of income although this 
evidence is suspect. For the baseline specification, the short-run ETI is 0.685 and 
there is no evidence for intertemporal adjustment. Estimates for the elasticity of 
broad income2 (EBI) are smaller compared to ETI estimates. My estimates are 
larger in magnitude than those in the existing literature for intertemporal 
adjustments. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
Estimating the sensitivity of income to changes in tax rates requires exogenous 
changes in tax rates. However, because the marginal tax rate is a function of 
income which is the dependent variable of the estimation equation, the observed 
tax rates are clearly endogenous. This concern has been widely recognized in the 
literature. The literature has addressed this issue by mostly utilizing a difference 
form specification and using marginal tax rates defined for some base-year income 





2 Broad income is an extensive definition of income which does not consider adjustments and 
deductions. I provide the definition of broad income in Section 1.4.2. 
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remain because the marginal tax rates constructed from base-year income are still 
a function of the dependent variable. As documented by Weber (2014), mean 
reversion and changing distribution of income can also lead to endogeneity in tax 
rates. For example, mean reversion causes the high income of top earners in the 
base year to fall in the subsequent year because the high income in the base year 
is likely to be due to a positive transitory income which is unrelated to tax changes, 
thereby producing a negative correlation between the base-year income and the 
error term in difference form. On the other hand, a widening distribution of income 
can produce a positive correlation between the base-year income and the error 
term. Because base-year income and the error term are correlated; and the tax 
rate is a direct function of base year income, the instrument for the net-of-tax rate 
will also be correlated with the error term.  
 
Feldstein (1995) is one of the pioneer studies that estimates ETI utilizing panel 
data. Based on different specifications and using the difference-in-differences 
method, he reports ETI estimates that range from 1 to 3. Following Feldstein 
(1995), a large number of panel-based studies emerged addressing different 
econometric issues discussed in the literature to obtain consistent and unbiased 
estimates. Auten and Carroll (1999) address mean reversion and diverging 
distribution of income by controlling for lagged income in the estimating equation. 
They report an elasticity of 0.55. Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) use panel data from 
the Survey of Consumer Finances instead of tax return data and examine the effect 
of the variation in marginal tax rates arising from TRA86. They report elasticity 
estimates ranging from 0.35 to 0.97. They also estimate the sensitivity of labor 
supply with respect to tax rate changes and conclude that the rise of taxable 
income of high-income individuals is not accompanied by an increase in reported 
labor supply. These conclusions are consistent with the notion of possible retiming 
of income. Gruber and Saez (2002) introduce the use of income splines to control 
for mean reversion and heterogeneous trends; and separate income and 
substitution effects of tax changes. They rely on the public use version of panel tax 
data and use the variation caused by TRA86. They find an elasticity of taxable 
income of 0.40 and an elasticity of broad income (EBI) of 0.12. 
 
Weber (2014) introduces a new instrument to address the mean reversion 
issue widely discussed in the literature. She uses lagged income instead of base-
year income to construct instruments for net-of-tax rates. She also verifies that as 
the number of lags increases, the lagged income and hence the instruments 
constructed from that lagged income become more orthogonal to the error term. 
She identifies the instruments based on lagged income using a testable 
assumption regarding the degree of serial correlation in the error term. Based on 
panel tax data for years 1979-1990 and addressing mean reversion issues, she 
reports an ETI estimate of 0.858 and EBI estimate of 0.475. Her reported ETI 
estimate is twice as large as that reported in Gruber and Saez (2002). Kawano et 
al. (2016) use the variation from the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 to 
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estimate EBI. They use an inverse probability weighting (IPW)3 in the context of a 
difference in differences approach and find significantly lower estimates of EBI 
ranging from 0.013 to 0.034. 
 
The notion of timing of income receipt was rooted in the hierarchy of behavioral 
responses to taxation by Slemrod (1990).  He suggests a hierarchy of three tiers 
of behavioral response to taxation. First two tiers of his hierarchy include timing 
and avoidance whereas the third tier refers to behavioral responses. Using panel 
data and focusing on realized capital gains, Burman and Randolph (1994) provide 
evidence for substantially smaller permanent effects than transitory effects. Bakija 
and Heim (2008), on the other hand, investigate the impact of taxation on 
charitable giving. They use an instrumental variable approach for estimating the 
elasticity of charitable giving with respect to its current and future prices.  They find 
evidence for re-timing of giving in response to predictable future changes in federal 
tax rates, however, this finding is sensitive to source of identification. 
 
The ETI literature, however, contains a few companion studies investigating 
the intertemporal impacts of tax changes on taxable income; and these studies are 
most relevant for my study. Kreiner et al. (2016) examine the ETI using monthly 
payroll data and provide evidence for intertemporal shifting of wage income with 
respect to tax rate changes. However, removing the data for a few months around 
the point of time when the tax change takes place, they find the elasticity close to 
zero. Goolsbee (2000) examines the responsiveness of income of high-income 
executives with respect to changes in tax rates and provides evidence for a short-
run shift in the timing of realization of compensation rather than a permanent 
reduction in income. Sammartino and Weiner (1997) demonstrate that income 
shifted backward in time from 1993 into 1992 (even when excluding capital gains) 
in response to President-elect Bill Clinton’s promised tax increase on high-income 
taxpayers. One of the most relevant studies for my present study is Giertz (2010). 
He investigates intertemporal responses of taxable income by using the variation 
from the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Acts (OBRAs) of 1990 and 1993. 
Based on panels of U.S. tax returns, he estimates short-run and long-run 
responses of taxable income to changes in tax rates. Giertz (2010) addresses the 
endogeneity in the tax rates by using predicted marginal net-of-tax rates based on 
base-year income. However, as explained previously, the use of base-year income 
in constructing the instruments does not guarantee that endogeneity in marginal 
tax rates will be resolved. Giertz (2010) reports larger long-run estimates than 
short-run estimates. Another companion study examining intertemporal responses 
is Holmlund and Soderstrom (2011). They investigate the intertemporal responses 





3 IPW approach removes the confounding by using inverse of probability as weights. 
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run estimates between 0.10 to 0.30. The intertemporal aspects considered in their 
study capture the habit persistence from past tax rates, however, the responses to 
predictable future tax rates are not considered. To the extent that taxpayers are 
aware of future tax changes ahead of time and that they intertemporally optimize 
by altering their current behavior in response to predictable future tax changes, the 
specification used in Holmlund and Soderstrom (2011) is also mis-specified. 
 
All of these concerns involving current knowledge on intertemporal responses 
to tax changes call for a further extension of the literature.  My study uses the 
instruments developed by Weber (2014) and extends the literature by addressing 
the endogeneity due to mean reversion in estimating short-run and long-run 
impacts of tax rates. Specifically, I use lagged values of income when constructing 
predicted net-of-tax rates, and test various lags of income for robustness. My 
baseline specification includes instruments based on 1-year lagged income and 
examines the endogeneity of this instrument assuming that instruments 
constructed from 2-year and 3-year lagged income are exogenous. I discuss the 






Changes in tax rates can affect taxpayers’ behavior in several ways. If tax rates 
increase, labor becomes more expensive relative to leisure. Therefore, an increase 
in tax rates can cause a decrease in labor supply thereby a decrease in income 
because of the substitution effect. An income effect can lead to an opposite result. 
Although in general, the magnitude of the elasticity of primary earners’ labor supply 
varies across studies, the magnitude for the secondary earner has been found to 
be large (Eissa, 1995). Second, different forms of income are taxed at different 
rates, and some forms are exempt from taxation.  For example, in 1990 taxpayers 
could claim tax exemption for a certain type of interest income as well as for a 
portion of pensions and annuities and IRA distributions. More interestingly, high-
income taxpayers, in most cases, can shift their income towards tax-favored forms 
of income, for instance, fringe benefits, stock options, etc. An increase (or 
decrease) in tax rates encourages taxpayers to take advantage of such tax 
treatment by shifting income towards tax-favored components. Not only do the 
taxpayers shift their income across components of income, but they can also shift 
expenditure towards tax-favored components to reduce taxable income. For 
example, an increase in tax rates can motivate taxpayers to increase their tax-
deductible expenditures on home mortgages, medical and dental treatments, or 
charitable contributions. A change in tax rates can also affect the extent of 
compliance with the tax laws regarding the accuracy of the reported income. An 
increased tax rate raises the opportunity cost of compliance and, therefore, may 
encourage tax evasion. Third, individuals can shift income across time to take 
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advantage of a favorable tax treatment. For example, if a taxpayer expects the tax 
rate to fall in the future period, he/she may consider deferring some compensation 
or pension income from the current to the future period, and/or he/she may 
consider shifting income from taxable bond to municipal bond in the current period 
to avoid taxes. Kreiner et al. (2016) provide evidence that employees shift their 
wage income intertemporally in an anticipation of tax changes.  
 
To explain intertemporal responses, I use the following intertemporal model 
that is employed by Goolsbee (2000). Giertz (2010) and Bakija and Heim (2008) 











+  𝜈𝑖 𝑡               (1.1) 
 
Equation (1.1) can also be written as follows. 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜷𝟏 + 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡) + 𝛽3∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1) + 𝜈𝑖 𝑡        (1.2) 
 
In equation (1.1), 𝜏𝑖 𝑡 is current marginal tax rate
4 of individual 𝑖 at time period 
𝑡, 𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1 is the marginal tax rate of individual 𝑖 at time period 𝑡 + 1, and 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is income. 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents a set of control variables used in the estimation, 𝛾𝑡 represent year 




change in current year’s marginal tax rates in log form whereas  𝛽2 represents the 
percentage change in taxable income for a one percent change in current period’s 
net-of-tax rates. Moreover, 𝑙𝑛
(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+2)
(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1)
 represents the change in anticipatory future 
tax rates whereas the coefficient 𝛽3 represents the responses to anticipatory future 
net-of-tax rates on income. Even though this model has been employed in the 




 and the denominator of 𝑙𝑛
(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+2)
(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1)
 may seem to cancel out 
each other from the right had side of the equation. However, they may cancel out 




 is an anticipated measure of the future year’s marginal 
net-of-tax rates whereas the numerator of 𝑙𝑛
(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1)
(1−𝜏𝑖 𝑡)
 is the marginal net-of-tax rate 
that taxpayers are aware of. Because there can be error involved in the anticipation 
process, these two terms may not necessarily be equal and cancel out each other 
in the right-hand side of equation (1.1). Moreover, as I have explained in previous 





















 from the first stage regressions instead of 
observed values for these two ratios. Since I am using fitted values instead of 
observed values, these two variables should not cancel out each other. Following 
previous studies in the literature, 𝛽2 represents the short-run elasticity and 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 
represents the long-run elasticity. 
 
The literature mostly uses difference-in-differences methods to estimate this 
type of model. This approach yields consistent estimates if tax rate changes are 
the only sources of income shocks. However, other non-tax factors (e.g. 
heterogeneous income growth and mean reversion) can lead to inconsistent 
estimates. Furthermore, because of the graduated tax rate schedule, tax rates are 
endogenous and can lead to biased estimates. The existing literature uses the 
instrumental variable approach and constructs instruments for marginal net-of-tax 
rates based on initial-year income to address the endogeneity issue. However, 
Weber (2014) shows that such instruments are endogenous. She uses lagged 
income to construct the instrument and shows that increasing each additional lag 
of income used to construct the instruments will make the instruments more 
exogenous. I use a difference-in-differences estimation method with one-year 
differences and apply the instruments developed by Weber (2014) to estimate the 
intertemporal model (1). For one-year differences specification, I make pairs of 
observations one year apart and regress the changes in income between pairs of 
observations on changes in net-of-tax rates along with other control variables. The 





=  𝝉(𝒀𝒊 𝒕−𝒌, 𝒄𝒕) 
 
Here  𝒄𝒕 is the tax law of year 𝑡. Therefore, the instrument, for example, for 









  and the instrument, for example, for ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡+1) based on one-








 . This simply means 
that the two predicted marginal tax rates in the difference form differ only by the 






5 Net of marginal tax rate instruments are computed by running income with the same lags through 




Following Weber (2014), I use a Difference-in-Sargan test to assess the 
endogeneity of the current- and lead-tax rate6 instruments. The Difference-in-
Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions that assumes a subset of 
instruments as exogenous and tests the validity of suspect instruments. It checks 
the validity of suspect instruments by computing the increase in Sargan’s J statistic 
when such suspect instruments are added to the estimation. To test the validity of 
two suspect instruments for two endogenous variables, at least three instruments 
are needed that are assumed to be exogenous. This means that at least five 
instruments are needed to implement Difference-in-Sargan test in a specification 
with two endogenous variables. This requirement for the minimum number of 
instruments is satisfied when I test the validity of instruments for current- and lead-
tax rates constructed from lagged income of year 𝑡 − 𝑖 assuming that instruments 
constructed from income of years 𝑡 − 𝑗 and 𝑡 − 𝑘 are exogenous where 𝑖 < 𝑗 < 𝑘. 








Most studies in the ETI literature have employed a difference-in-differences or 
a similar approach. This study follows the spirit of the conventional approach and 
uses a difference-in-differences estimation method. For identification of the effect 
of tax changes in an ideal scenario, the control group would not experience a tax 
change, and the treatment group would experience a tax change. Unfortunately, 
such a control group does not exist because the groups of taxpayers that face 
differential tax treatments are also different in terms of demographic 
characteristics. Therefore, the next best solution is to find two similar groups that 
experience differential tax treatments. TRA86 creates an opportunity for 
identification of the effect of tax changes because high-income taxpayers 
experience larger reductions in tax rates than lower-income individuals. In an ideal 





marginal tax rates. For instance, for constructing a tax rate instrument as a function of income of 
two-year lag, I compute synthetic tax rates using income of year t-3 and tax codes for year t-1 (base 
year); and similarly I compute synthetic tax rates using income of year t-3 and tax codes for year t; 
and then I take the difference of the log of the two synthetic tax rates. 
6 For simplicity, I refer to the marginal net-of-tax rate for the current period as current tax rate; and 
marginal net-of-tax rate for the future period as lead tax rate. 
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treatment status. However, in reality, the high- and low-income groups may not 
necessarily be similar. Specifically, higher-income taxpayers generally have higher 
income growth rates than lower-income individuals. Bound and Johnson (1992), 
Kutz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Michel (1991), and Murphy and Welch (1992) 
provide evidence that labor earning became more unequal during 1980s. 
Moreover, Krugman (1992) highlights that very high-income households received 
a disproportionately large share of income growth during 1980s. One obvious 
approach to address these issues is to control for these heterogeneous 
characteristics. However, the US-based studies generally utilize tax panel data 
from the IRS, and these datasets generally include minimal socio-demographic 
information. These identification concerns have drawn considerable attention in 
the literature, and addressing these issues has been a difficult challenge because 
such heterogeneous effects are not well understood. Several non-US studies claim 
to be able to mitigate these issues by using rich socio-demographic information. 
On the other hand, given the unavailability of such rich data, the US studies 
commonly use income controls to mitigate these effects. I will discuss the 




I obtain the data used in this study from Statistics of Income (SOI) tax files for 
U.S. tax returns for the years 1979-1990. The individual SOI tax files are combined 
to construct a panel of years 1979-1990. Because the instruments are functions of 
lagged income of up to four years, I lose observations of years 1979-1982 in the 
estimation. Moreover, I also lose observations of year 1990 because the model 
includes one-year lead tax rates and year 1989 because of the use of one-year 
difference form. Therefore, the estimation is restricted to between 1983 and 1988. 
The study primarily uses taxable income for the definition of income as a 
dependent variable. An extension of this analysis to broad income is also 
presented in a later section. Broad income is total income from all income sources 
(except capital gains) that can be computed from the data for all years 1979-1990. 
Most previous studies have excluded capital gains from the analysis. As is 
common in the literature, I exclude capital gains from the analysis. Social security 
benefits are also excluded from the definition of broad income because they are 
not included in the data before 1984. Taxable income is defined as the broad 
income minus above-the-line deductions (i.e., adjustments) minus the larger of 
below-the-line deductions (i.e., the larger of standard deductions and itemized 
deductions), minus personal exemptions that are available in each year. 
 
Tax reforms generally involve changes in the tax base along with tax rates and 
other changes. If the tax base varies systematically, then this variation in the tax 
base can potentially bias the estimates. The literature has addressed this issue by 
using a constant-law definition of taxable income. Consistent with the literature, I 
use the definition of taxable income that is constant across reforms whereas the 
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constant-law definition of taxable income is close to the 1990 definition of taxable 
income. All income, and deduction components are converted into 1992 dollars 
using inflation indices used in Gruber and Saez (2002).  
 
Marginal tax rates are computed using TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993), 
a freely available internet version of the tax rate calculator developed by NBER.7 
TAXSIM computes federal and state marginal tax rates separately. The effective 
marginal tax rate is a summation of state and federal marginal tax rates. Only 
observations for which a taxpayer’s marital status do not change between the base 
and the current years are included in the analysis  because a change in marital 
status can cause changes in income unrelated to changes in tax rates. Finally, as 
has become standard in the literature, I exclude taxpayers whose taxable income 
is less than $10,000 in the base year to reduce the impact of mean reversion. It is 
evident in the literature that mean reversion is severe in the extreme low-income 
range and avoiding this income group can help reduce the impact from mean 
reversion. Following Weber (2014), I include several control variables in my 
estimation, for example, indicators for marital status, and the number of dependent 
children in the household, a full set of state and year dummy indicators. Table A.1 
presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. 
 
1.4.3 Identification Issues   
 
As explained in the previous section, the existence of heterogeneous income 
trends and mean reversion poses a challenge in estimating ETI. These issues 
have drawn substantial attention in the literature. Some studies were able to 
partially control for heterogeneous trends by using demographic information. Other 
studies have employed income controls to control for heterogeneous trends. Early 
studies include income as a control in a linear fashion (Carroll, 1998). However, a 
linear relationship between the income control variable and the error term may not 
exist.  More recent studies employ non-linear income splines to address the issue. 
Non-linear income splines allow a smooth and non-linear relationship between the 
income control variable and the error term. Gruber and Saez (2002) introduce the 
use of income splines in the ETI literature, and the subsequent studies followed 
Gruber and Saez (2002) by including income splines in the estimations to control 
for mean reversion and heterogeneous trends. Following the literature I also use 
income splines and include five-piece quintile splines based on income in the 
estimating equation to control for heterogeneous trends. I also examine the 










1.4.4 Instrument Selection 
 
This section explores the suitable instruments for the two endogenous 
variables of interest: current- and lead-tax rates. Column 1 of Table 1.1 presents 
replication of Weber’s (2014) ETI estimate using my data whereas columns 2-4 in 
Table 1.1 present estimates for the second stage regression of equation (1.1) 
using different lagged instruments for current- and lead-tax rates. The dependent 
variable in all four columns is ∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡.The first stage regression estimates for this 
table and all subsequent tables are included in Appendix A. The primary purpose 
of Table 1.1 is to empirically examine and find the instruments that are exogenous 
as well as correlated with the two endogenous regressors. Both first-stage and 
second-stage regressions presented in Table 1.1 and all other subsequent tables 
in this essay adjust for heteroscedasticity clustered by the individual level. Pflueger 
et al. (2013) raises concern that when first-stage F-statistics do not adjust for 
heteroscedasticity, the values of F-statistics can be large leading to rejection of 
weak instruments. They suggest that F-statistics need to be adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity to implement test for weakness of instruments. My results 
address this concern by adjusting heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered at the individual level in all first-stage regressions. A Difference-in-
Sargan test is employed to test the exogeneity of the instruments. The null 
hypothesis of this test is that the suspect instrument(s) is(are) exogenous. The 
weakness of the instruments is examined by comparing the F-statistics from the 
first stage regressions with the minimum F-statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo 
(2002). My estimated elasticity for Weber’s (2014) baseline specification is 0.722 
whereas her reported estimate8 is 0.858. First-stage regression estimates for 








8 I have some limitations while replicating Weber’s (2014) estimates. Weber’s estimates are based 
on the full version of TAXSIM which utilizes all the variables in SOI and which is available 
exclusively on NBER server. On the other hand, I use the publicly available version of TAXSIM 
which computes tax rates based on only 27 input variables and does not take into account all the 
available variables in SOI. For example, publicly available TAXSIM version does not have direct 
input variables for standard deduction and personal exemption, rather it computes them from the 
variables provided as input. However, it does not have any input for primary and secondary 
taxpayer’s blindness status either and computes the personal exemption and standard deduction 
without taking into account blindness status. Similarly, there are other variables in SOI that are not 
used as input in the publicly available TAXSIM version. In addition to this limitation, I also don’t 
have the exact information of how Weber cleaned and prepared the individual SOI files and 




Table 1. 1: Second-stage regression estimates for instrument selection 




   
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) 0.722** -0.299*** 0.685** 1.209*** 
 (0.294) (0.115) (0.293) (0.375) 
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1)  0.147 0.151 0.0493 
  (0.259) (0.340) (0.389) 
Observations 23,438 24,731 24,731 24,731 
R-squared -0.140 0.071 -0.125 -0.262 
Instruments 2 3 4 lags 0 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 2 3 4 lags 
Diff-in-Sargan p-val 0.810 7.04e-05 0.245 0.217 






Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table (and in all other tables in this 
essay) adjust for heteroscedasticity clustered at the individual level. R-squared value 
being between 0-1 is the property of OLS. However, unlike in case of OLS, R-squared 
from IV regression can be negative because Residual Sum of Squared (RSS) can be 
larger than Total Sum of Squares (SST) in case of IV regressions. R-squared value in 






Columns 2-4 of Table 1.1 examine the exogeneity and weakness of the 
instruments in the basic specification. The first stage regression estimates for 
these columns of Table 1.1 are included in Table A.3 in Appendix A. Column 2 of 
Table 1.1 includes instruments for current tax rate and lead tax rate constructed 
based on base-year income, two-year lagged income and three-year lagged 
income. First stage F-statistics from the regressions of current and lead-tax rates 
are 276.21 and 46.05 respectively which are much larger than the minimum value 
suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002).9 The Difference-in-Sargan test for this 
column examines whether the two instruments constructed based on base-year 
income are exogenous, assuming that the instruments based on two- and three-





9 For two endogenous variables and six excluded instruments, if one wants to limit the bias of IV 




Difference-in-Sargan p-value is close to zero; therefore, we can strongly reject the 
null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous at any conventional level of 
significance. Column 3 includes instruments constructed based on one-year 
lagged income, two-year lagged income and three-year lagged income. The 
Difference-in-Sargan p-value is 0.245, so the instruments are more plausibly 
exogenous compared to those in column 2. First stage F-statistics from the 
regressions of current- and lead-tax rates are 52.40 and 39.09 respectively, 
suggesting that the instruments are strong. Column 4 includes instruments 
constructed from two-, three- and four-year lagged income. The Difference-in-
Sargan p-value now slightly decreases to 0.217. First stage F-statistics from the 
regressions of current- and lead-tax rates are 37.43 and 39.71 respectively which 
are also much larger than the minimum value suggested by Stock and Yogo 
(2002). I choose the specification in column (3) (instruments constructed based on 
one-, two- and three-year lagged income) as my preferred specification based on 
the Difference-in-Sargan p-value and values of first-stage F-statistics. Column (3) 
is my preferred specification because Difference-in-Sargan p-value is larger (i.e., 
instruments are more exogenous) and first-stage F-statistics are also larger 
compared to other specifications. For the baseline specification, the coefficient on 
current-tax rate is 0.69 and is significant at the 5% level whereas the coefficient on 
the lead tax rate is 0.15 but this coefficient is not significant at the 10% level of 
significance with large p value (p value is 0.658). These baseline results do not 
provide any evidence for intertemporal adjustments.10 
 
1.4.5 Stability of Income Controls 
 
As is discussed previously, heterogeneous income growth poses a challenge 
in estimating ETI because such heterogeneous effects are not well understood. 
The recent literature addresses this issue by controlling for income as an 
alternative to controlling for socio-demographic characteristics. Table 1.2 
examines the stability of the estimates for various lags needed to construct these 
splines. The estimates from the first stage regressions for this table are included 








10 I do not adjust my estimates for sample weights as my data do not have high-income oversample. 
This means that all taxpayers have the same probability of being selected in the sample regardless 
of the income level. Weber (2014) also doesn’t adjust for sample weights as her data do not have 
high income oversample. My dataset includes 177 high-income taxpayers with missing state 
information. The estimated results for the baseline specification remain unchanged when I estimate 




Table 1. 2: Second-stage regression estimates with income controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 










∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) 0.661** 1.810*** 0.748** 0.537 
 (0.282) (0.458) (0.347) (0.329) 
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) 0.161 1.160** 0.230 0.00771 
 (0.336) (0.454) (0.399) (0.380) 
Observations 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 
R-squared -0.119 -0.377 -0.136 -0.097 
Spline lags No Spline 0 1 2 
Lags of income for 
constructing 
instruments 
1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 











Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity 





Table 1.2 includes instruments based on income lagged one, two and three 
years prior to the base year. However, columns 1-4 in Table 1.2 varies by the 
number of lags used to construct income splines. Column 1 repeats the baseline 
column 3 of Table 1.1 and does not include any splines. The coefficient on the 
current-year tax rates is 0.661 and is significant at the 5% level whereas the 
coefficient on the anticipated tax rates in imprecise. Column 2 includes income 
splines based on base-year income. The coefficient on the current-year tax rates 
in 1.81 and that on the future tax rates is 1.16. These estimates are much larger 
than those in the current literature. However, because these splines used in 
column 2 are a function of base-year income, it is unlikely that these splines will 
be able to absorb heterogeneous trends. For this reason, Kopczuk (2005) uses 
lagged income instead of initial year income to construct the income splines. 
Weber (2014) also finds very large elasticity (2.40) for this specification. For all 
these reasons, the results in column 2 are suspect. When I include income splines 
constructed based on one-year lagged income (column 3), the coefficient on the 
current tax rates becomes 0.75 and is significant at the 5% level, however, the 
coefficient on the anticipated future tax rates is again imprecise. Column 4 includes 







Tax treatments generally apply to different subgroups of taxpayers 
differentially. In this section, I examine heterogeneity among taxpayers based on 
income and marital status in response to tax changes. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 
1.3 present ETI estimates for taxpayers with broad income less than $40,000 and 
larger than $40,000 respectively. Both columns include instruments based on one-
, two- and three-year lagged income and does not include any income splines (my 
preferred specification in Table 1.1). For taxpayers with broad income less than 
$40,000 (column 1), the coefficients on both current and lead tax rates are 
imprecise at the 10% level of significance. Moreover, both first stage F-statistics 
suggest that instruments are weak. For taxpayers with broad income larger than 
$40,000 (Column 2), the coefficients on the current tax rates is 0.702 and is 
significant at the 5% level. Both first stage F-statistics from this specification are 
larger than suggested minimum value. These results provide evidence that higher-
income taxpayers are more responsive to changes in tax rates compared to lower 
income group. However, I don’t find evidence for intertemporal adjustment as the 





Table 1. 3: Second-stage regression estimates for heterogeneity based on 
income 
 (1) (2) 
 <40k BI >40k BI 
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) 0.628 0.702** 
 (1.083) (0.312) 
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) -0.479 0.509 
 (1.158) (0.373) 
Observations 10,984 13,747 
R-squared -0.121 -0.155 
Diff-in-Sargan p-val 0.164 0.675 
Spline lags No splines No splines 
Lags of income for constructing the instruments 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 




Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity 







Table 1.4 shows the estimates for two groups based on marital status using the 
preferred specification in Table 1.1. Column 1 presents estimates for single 
taxpayers whereas column 2 presents estimates for married taxpayers. For single 
filers, the coefficients on both current and lead tax rates are not significant whereas 
the instruments are weak. For married taxpayers, the first stage F-statistics are 
much larger than the minimum value suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002). The 
results are in agreement with those from all previous specifications suggesting that 
married taxpayers are responsive to tax changes. The results further indicate that 






Table 1. 4: Second-stage regression estimates for heterogeneity based on 
marital status 
 (1) (2) 
 Single Married 
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) -0.256 0.869** 
 (0.503) (0.437) 
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) -0.707 0.430 
 (0.521) (0.486) 
Observations 6,198 17,202 
R-squared 0.021 -0.150 
Diff-in-Sargan p-val 0.175 0.688 
Spline lags No splines No splines 
Lags of income for constructing instruments 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 




Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity 





1.4.7 Elasticity of Broad Income 
 
As highlighted in Section 1.3, an individual taxpayer can respond to changes in 
tax rates through several margins including adjustment of the amount of labor 
supply, tax avoidance by changing the form and timing of compensation, tax 
evasion, etc. ETI captures all these responses. For instance, a taxpayer facing an 
increased tax rates may shift his/her incomes and expenditures towards tax-
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favored components thereby reducing overall taxable income without altering real 
behavior. Such a behavioral response affects ETI although the real behavior is 
unaltered. ETI is considered to be a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis when 
there are no classic and fiscal externalities. However, in case of externalities, an 
elasticity of a broader definition of income is needed along with ETI. The literature 
argues that some below-the-line deductions, for example, deductions for charitable 
contributions, state and local taxes, home mortgage interests, etc., can create 





Table 1. 5: Second-stage regression estimates for elasticity of broad income 
 (1) (2) (3) 




∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) 0.186 0.739** 0.304 
 (0.192) (0.289) (0.238) 
∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) 0.122 0.604** 0.222 
 (0.201) (0.270) (0.238) 
Observations 24,937 24,937 24,937 
R-squared -0.040 -0.212 -0.073 
Spline lags No Spline 0 1 
Instrument lags 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 
Diff-in-Sargan p-val 0.872 0.572 0.857 






Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity 





The primary difference between taxable income and broad income is that broad 
income does not include deductions whereas taxable income does. Table 1.5 
shows the estimates for EBI using different specifications. Each column in Table 
1.5 includes instruments based on income lagged one, two and three years prior 
to the base year. Column 1 does not include any income splines whereas columns 
2 and 3 include five-piece splines constructed from base-year and one-year lagged 
income respectively. The results suggest that estimates are sensitive to income 
splines used in the specification. Both coefficients are significant at the 5% level 
when income splines are constructed based on base-year income  (Column 2). 
However, for reasons explained in Section 1.4.5, these results are suspect. For 
the remaining two specifications, first-stage F-statistics are larger than the 
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minimum values but both the coefficients are imprecise at any conventional level 
of significance. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
are equal to zero. The EBI estimates from all three specifications are smaller than 





This study revisits the intertemporal responses to changes in tax rates. The 
results from this study provide some evidence that the estimates for intertemporal 
responses to taxation in the existing literature are likely biased because the 
instruments are endogenous. This study also identifies the instruments that should 
yield estimates that are, at least, closer to consistent estimates compared to those 
in the prior literature. For most of the specifications, estimated results do not 
provide evidence for intertemporal adjustment. . The results from the specification 
controlling for base-year income splines provide some weak evidence of 
intertemporal adjustment, however, these estimates are suspect. The short-run 
ETI in my preferred specification is 0.69 whereas estimates for EBI are much 
smaller and imprecise. My short-run elasticity is larger than that found in Giertz 
(2010) but smaller than the estimate found in Goolsbee (2000). Giertz (2010) and 
Goolsbee (2000) provide evidence for existence of intertemporal adjustment. 
However, using more exogenous instruments, my results, in general, do not 
support the existence of intertemporal adjustment. Kreiner et al. (2016) provide 
evidence for intertemporal shifting using Danish payroll data. However, they do not 
find evidence for shifting income earned over entire year when they remove last 
two months’ income before the implementation of tax reform and one month’s 
income after the tax changes take place. Perhaps my results are different from 
Kreiner et al. (2016) because of the differences in the nature of tax laws in two 
countries. In Denmark, it is possible to report income earned from one period as 
income earned in another period without violating the tax laws whereas it is not 
possible in the USA.  Because ETI estimates are larger than those for EBI, the 
results in my study are also indicative that most of the responses of taxable income 
take place through deductions. ETI may be more relevant for policymakers more 
concerned about revenue-maximizing tax rates. On the other hand, EBI may be 
more useful for analyzing real behavior because EBI does not include tax 
avoidance behavior. Results found in this study have policy consequences. Since, 
in general, I don’t find evidence for intertemporal adjustment, these results are 
indicative that the actual efficiency cost of taxation may not necessarily be larger 
in the long run compared to that in the short run. Therefore, policymakers may 
have more flexibility in raising revenue without affecting much efficiency cost in the 
long run. However, estimating the exact magnitude of optimal tax rates considering 
the intertemporal responses is beyond the scope of this study and remains an area 






CHAPTER II  





The Elasticity of Taxable Income (ETI) and the Elasticity of Broad Income (EBI) 
are two central parameters of interest in tax policy analysis. Although there has 
been a large body of literature addressing these policy parameters, there has been 
little consensus regarding the magnitude of these parameters. The literature 
recognizes that these parameters cannot be thought of independent behavioral 
responses but, rather these parameters can be affected by tax policy itself. 
Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) and Kopczuk (2005) provide evidence that 
elasticities are larger for a tax system with a larger amount of deductions and 
therefore, any changes in tax rates have a direct impact on income as well as an 
indirect impact caused by the interaction between tax rates and the amount of 
deductions. This implies that the behavioral responses and, therefore, the 
efficiency cost of taxation can be controlled by controlling the amount of allowable 
deductions. Kopczuk (2005) estimates this indirect effect of changes in tax rates 
and his estimated parameter is in the order of 0.7 to 0.8. In my study, I revisit this 
indirect effect of changes in tax rates using a recent estimation method developed 
by Weber (2014). My estimated results support this hypothesis. The findings from 
my study demonstrate that EBI is not an exogenous parameter, rather it depends 
on the tax base. However, the magnitude of the tax base effect is smaller when 
compared to the magnitudes in the prior literature. This finding 
has significant implications on the efficiency cost of taxation. This finding implies 
that the tax base has an impact on the efficiency of taxation and, therefore, any 
analysis of the efficiency cost of taxation ignoring the tax base effect is incomplete. 
We need to take into account both tax rates and tax base to better understand the 
efficiency cost of taxation. 
 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
Prior research recognizes that that the behavioral responses of tax rate 
changes are not independent, and external factors can influence this parameter 
thereby affecting the efficiency cost of taxation. For instance, Harju and Matikka 
(2016) argue that external factors such as third-party reporting can affect the 
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behavioral responses of taxpayers. Keiner et al. (2014, 2016), Kleven et al. (2011) 
as well as Kleven et al. (2016) also provide similar arguments. The literature has 
also documented that behavioral responses can be affected by economic 
conditions. Hargaden (2020) demonstrates that the behavioral responses are 
smaller during the economic recession and therefore the behavioral responses are 
affected by economic fluctuations. These pieces of evidence demonstrate that 
behavioral responses are not exogenous parameters and, therefore, can be 
affected by other external factors. 
 
The conceptual foundation of how the tax base can affect taxable income has 
been discussed in Slemrod (1995) and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002). They argue 
that a larger amount of deductions is associated with larger elasticities. This 
implies that the behavioral responses can depend on allowable deductions and 
therefore the efficiency cost of taxation also depends on the prevailing tax 
structure. Kopczuk (2005) provides extensive empirical evidence supporting this 
hypothesis. He uses tax return data to identify the direct and indirect impact of 
taxation. Using an instrumental variables approach and a difference-in-differences 
estimation method, he estimates the indirect elasticity of broad income with respect 
to changes in net-of-tax rates in the order of 0.7 to 0.8. As discussed in the 
literature, tax rates are endogenous as they are direct functions of income because 
of graduated tax rates. Moreover, he also points out that the tax base can also 
depend on income indirectly. This turns out that both net-of-tax-tax rates and net-
of-tax-tax base11 are endogenous. He addresses this endogeneity by using an 
instrumental variable approach. He constructs the instruments as functions of base 
year income. 
 
As discussed in the first essay, Weber (2014) introduces a new instrument to 
address the mean reversion issue widely discussed in the literature. She uses 
lagged income instead of base-year income to construct the predicted net-of-tax 
rate instruments. I estimate the elasticity of broad income with respect to net-of-
tax rates and the indirect impact of net-of-tax rates using the estimation method 
developed by Weber (2014) and address the endogeneity due to the mean 
reversion using instruments constructed based on lagged income. My baseline 
specification includes instruments based on one-year lagged income and 
examines the endogeneity of these instruments assuming that instruments 
constructed from two-year and three-year lagged income are exogenous. Using 





11 Net-of-tax base is one minus the share of taxable income with respect to broad income. Net-of-
tax base also refers to the share of deductions with respect to broad income. Net-of-tax-base and 
the share of deductions are used interchangeably in this study. 
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changes in tax rates in the range of 0.07-0.12 which is significantly smaller than 




Data used in this essay are mostly similar to those used in the first essay. 
Similar to the first essay, I combine the individual SOI tax files into a panel of years 
1979-1990. The estimates are primarily based on two-year differences. Moreover, 
a sensitivity analysis has also been presented for one- and three-year differences. 
I lose six years of observations for using two-year differences and for using 
instruments constructed based on up to four-year lagged income. Therefore, the 
estimation is restricted to between 1983 and 1988. The study uses broad income 
for the definition of income as the dependent variable.12  
 
In my study, I follow the definition of the net-of-tax base used by Kopczuk 
(2005). Specifically, I consider all the itemized deductions, adjustments for AGI, 
and reported income that are not included in AGI (Adjusted Gross Income).13 
Inelastic standard deductions and personal exemptions are not included in the 
definition of net of tax base. The net of tax base is then computed as the ratio of 
the total of such itemized deductions, adjustments, and non-taxable reported 
income with respect to broad income. All income and, deduction components are 
converted into 1992 dollars using inflation indices used in Gruber and Saez (2002).  
 
Similar to the first essay, I compute the marginal tax rates for this study using 
TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) developed by NBER. Data used in this study 
are limited to those observations for which a taxpayer’s marital status does not 
change between two years for the paired observations because a change in marital 
status can cause changes in income unrelated to changes in tax rates or tax bases. 
Finally, as I have done in the first essay, I exclude taxpayers whose broad income 
is less than $10,000 in the base year to avoid extreme mean reversion. I include 
several control variables in my estimation including indicators for marital status and 
the number of dependent children in the household, a full set of state and year 
dummy indicators. After imposing these restrictions, I obtain 16,184 observation 
for the baseline specification. The number of observations is smaller than that in 
the first essay primarily because there are observations with missing itemized 
deductions. Those observations with missing deductions can still be used in the 
estimations in the first essay but cannot be used in the second essay. Table B.1 





12 Broad income is defined in Section 1.4.2. 




2.4 Identification and Estimation 
 
The Tax Reform Act 1986 (TRA86) was the most significant tax reform within 
a thirty-year window of that decade. TRA86 not only changed the marginal tax 
rates but also broadened the tax base. For instance, TRA86 reduced the 
deductible portion for certain business meals and entertainment. TRA86 
eliminated the adjustment for married couples when both work. It also eliminated 
the deduction for personal interest (for itemizers) and eliminated the deductions 
for charitable contributions made by a non-itemizer. Moreover, TRA86 changed 
the treatment of moving expenses from an above-the-line adjustment to an 
itemized deduction. In addition to these changes, TRA86 also changed IRA limits 
and deductibility for medical and miscellaneous expenses. I use this variation 
caused by TRA86 to identify the impact of changes in tax base on the behavioral 
responses. 
 
To estimate the impact of changes in tax base, I use a difference-in-differences 
estimation method. My baseline specification uses two-year differences where I 
make pairs of observations two years apart and regress the changes in income 
between pairs of observations on changes in net-of-tax rates and changes in the 
net-of-tax base along with other control variables. In the basic specification, I 
investigate the impact of tax base only and use only those observations whose 
marginal tax rates are unchanged across two years of the differences. For this 
analysis, I estimate the following equation. 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜷𝟏 + 𝛽3∆𝑙𝑛𝛾𝑖 𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖 𝑡                        (2.1) 
 
In equation (2.1), 𝛾𝑖 𝑡 is the share of deductions with respect to broad income 
for individual 𝑖 at time period 𝑡, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is income of individual 𝑖 at time period 𝑡 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
represents a set of control variables used in the estimation. Then, I allow net-of-
tax rates to vary and extend the analysis by estimating the following two equations. 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜷𝟏 + 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡) + 𝛽3∆𝑙𝑛𝛾𝑖 𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖 𝑡              (2.2) 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝜷𝟏 + 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡) + 𝛽3∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑖 𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡)) + 𝜈𝑖 𝑡      (2.3) 
 
Here, 𝜏𝑡 is the marginal tax rate. 𝛽3 in equation (2.2) represents the impact of 
changes in net-of-tax base controlling for marginal net-of-tax rates and other 
variables whereas 𝛽3 in equation (2.3) represents the impact of tax base on EBI or 
the indirect impact of changes in tax rates. Kopczuk (2005) estimates equation 
(2.3) using instruments constructed from base-year income and I estimate the 




The primary focus of this study is to estimate equation (2.3). However, to 
understand how the estimates vary across specifications, I also estimate equations 
(2.1) and (2.2) along with (2.3). I include the interaction between net-of-tax tax 
rates and net-of-tax base as well as net-of-tax rates but not the net-of-tax base 
separately. The rationale for such specification has been explained in Kopczuk 
(2005). Tax base matters to the taxpayers only through tax saving and, therefore, 
we may not expect an independent tax base effect. 
 
The challenge of estimating the above equation is the endogeneity of the two 
explanatory variables: net-of-tax-rate and share of deductible expenses (i.e., net-
of-tax base). Net-of-tax-rate is a direct function of income and therefore the 
exogeneity condition for identification is violated. On the other hand, some 
deductions, e.g. deductions for medical and miscellaneous expenditures are also 
direct functions of income and therefore subject to additional limitations. Moreover, 
the net-of-tax base can indirectly depend on income. This implies that the net-of-
tax base is also correlated with the unobserved error term in the estimating 
equation and therefore is endogenous. Kopczuk (2005) addresses this 
endogeneity concern and uses an instrumental variable approach to consistently 
estimate the parameter. He constructs the instrumental variables for net-of-tax 
base and net-of-tax rates as functions of base-year income. However, as evident 
in Weber (2014), such instruments may not guarantee the exogeneity of 
instruments because these instruments are still functions of the base-year income, 
which is the dependent variable of the estimating equation. 
 
I use lagged values of income to construct the instruments for net-of-tax rates 
and the share of deductible expenses. Synthetic tax rates are computed using the 
TAXSIM program provided by NBER. Specifically, I compute the predicted tax 
rates by running income components and other information for a lagged period 
through TAXSIM for the year of interest. Similarly, I compute the predicted net-of-
tax base using lagged incomes. 
 
I use a Difference-in-Sargan test to assess the endogeneity of the instruments 
used in the estimation. The Difference-in-Sargan test is a test of overidentifying 
restrictions that assumes a subset of instruments as exogenous and tests the 
validity of suspect instruments. It checks the validity of suspect instruments by 
computing the increase in Sargan’s J statistic when such suspect instruments are 
added to the estimation. To test the validity of two suspect instruments for two 
endogenous variables, at least three instruments are needed that are assumed to 
be exogenous. This means that at least five instruments are needed to implement 
the Difference-in-Sargan test in a specification with two endogenous variables. I 






2.5 Empirical Results 
 
I begin my analysis by first investigating the impact of the net-of-tax base only 
while keeping tax rates constant across two years of the paired observations. For 
that purpose, I estimate equation (2.1) using a limited sample. As opposed to the 
full sample, this limited sample includes only those pair of observations for which 
net-of-tax rates are equal across two years of the paired observations whereas the 
full sample does not have such restriction and the net-of-tax rates across two years 
of the paired observations in the full sample can be equal or unequal. The 





Table 2. 1: Second-stage IV regression estimates using net-of-tax base 
only 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸) 0.0709*** 0.0699*** 0.0683*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0118) 
Observations 2,226 2,226 2,226 
R-squared -0.065 -0.063 -0.060 
Instruments 0 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 2 3 4 lags 
First stage F-statistic 2391 2217 2289 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table (and in all other tables in this 
essay) adjust for heteroscedasticity clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, 





Columns 1-3 of Table 2.1 present estimates using instruments of different 
lagged values. The first stage regression estimates for these columns of Table 2.1 
are included in Table B.2 in Appendix B. The weakness of the instruments is 
examined by comparing the F-statistics from the first stage regressions with the 
minimum F-statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002). The endogeneity of the 
instruments is examined by observing the p-value of the Difference-in-Sargan test. 
The null hypothesis of this test is that the suspect instrument(s) is(are) exogenous. 
The first stage F-statistic is large for each column implying that the instruments are 
strong. However, the Difference-in-Sargan p-value is not reported for all three 
columns because estimates in these three columns are based on only a small 
number of observations in the limited sample which includes a restriction that 
marginal net-of-tax rates are equal across two years of the paired observations. 
Hence, I do not have any information regarding the endogeneity of the instruments 
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used in this table. However, in the subsequent tables, I remove this constraint, and 
as a result, I end up with a larger number of observations which are sufficient to 
compute the Different-in-Sargan p-value. Column (1) in Table 2.1 presents the 
estimates using the instruments for net-of-tax base constructed as a function of 
base-year income as well as the income of two- and three-year lags. Column (2) 
presents estimates using instruments with one-, two- and three-year lagged 
income. Column (3) presents estimates using instruments with two-, three- and 
four-year lagged income. In all three specifications, the coefficient on the net of tax 
base is positive and significant at the 1% level. The magnitudes are similar and in 
the order of 0.07 in all three columns. 
 
Estimates in Table 2.1 are based on a limited sample where tax rates are 
unchanged across years of the paired observations. Table 2.2 eliminates this 
constraint and utilizes the full sample to estimate equation (2.2) which includes 





Table 2. 2: Second stage regression estimates for the IV regression with net-of-
tax rates and net-of-tax base 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)  -0.214* 0.203 -0.0320 
  (0.112) (0.201) (0.219) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸) 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 
 (0.00685) (0.00666) (0.00705) (0.00682) 
Observations 16,184 16,184 16,184 16,184 
R-squared -0.124 -0.052 -0.198 -0.112 
Instruments 0 2 3 lags 0 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 2 3 4 lags 
Diff-in-Sargan p-val 0.140 0.0485 0.862 0.366 
First stage F-statistic  231, 4253 61, 4169 56, 4158 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity clustered 





I present column 1 in Table 2.2 to compare the results with those in Table 2.1. 
Column 1 in Table 2.1 and column 1 in Table 2.2 are based on the same 
specification but use different samples. Columns 2-4 of Table 2.2 examine the 
endogeneity and weakness of the instruments. The first stage regression 
estimates for this Table 2.2 are included in Table B.3 in Appendix B. Column 2 of 
Table 2.2 includes instruments for net-of-tax rates and net-of-tax base constructed 
based on base-year income, two-year lagged income and three-year lagged 
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income. First stage F-statistics from the regressions of net-of-tax rates and net-of-
tax base are 231 and 4253 respectively which are much larger than the minimum 
value suggested by Stock and Yogo14 (2002). The Difference-in-Sargan test for 
this column examines whether the instruments for the two endogenous variables 
constructed based on base-year income are exogenous, assuming that the 
instruments based on two-year and three-year lagged income are exogenous. 
Although the instruments are not weak, the Difference-in-Sargan p-value is close 
to zero; therefore, we can strongly reject the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are exogenous. Column 3 includes instruments constructed based on one-year 
lagged income, two-year lagged income, and three-year lagged income. The 
Difference-in-Sargan p-value is 0.86, and therefore the instruments are more 
exogenous when constructed from one-, two- and three-year lagged income 
compared to those when constructed from base-year income, two-year lagged 
income and three-year lagged income. First stage F-statistics from the regressions 
of net-of-tax rates and net-of-tax base are 61 and 4169 respectively, suggesting 
that the endogeneity of the instruments is not a concern. Column 4 includes 
instruments constructed from two-year, three-year and four-year lagged income. 
While the instruments are strong according to the guidelines suggested by Stock 
and Yogo (2002), the Difference-in-Sargan p-value now decreases to 0.37. My 
preferred specification in Table 2.2 is that of column 3 for which the Diff-in-Sargan 
p-value is larger implying that instruments are more exogenous compared to those 
in the other two columns, and the first stage F-statistic is also large implying the 
instruments are strong. The coefficient on the net-of-tax rates is 0.20 and is not 
significant whereas the coefficient on the net-of-tax base is 0.11 and is significant 
at the 1% level. These results support the finding from Table 2.1, however, the 
magnitude of the coefficient on the net-of-tax base is slightly larger. 
 
Estimated results from the IV regression with net-of-tax rates and the 
interaction are presented in Table 2.3. The first stage regression estimates for this 
table are included in Table B.4 in Appendix B. Columns 1-3 of Table 2.3 examine 
the endogeneity and weakness of the instruments. First stage F-statistics from all 
three columns imply strong instruments. A comparison of the Diff-in-Sargan p-
values provides findings similar to the ones in Table 2.1. Instruments are more 
exogenous when they are constructed based on one-, two- and three-year lagged 
income (column 2). Column 2 is my preferred specification and the estimated 
results for this specification suggest that the coefficient on the net-of-tax rates is 
positive but insignificant. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and 





14 For two endogenous variables and six excluded instruments, if one wants to limit the bias of IV 
estimator to 5% of OLS bias, the minimum F-statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) is 15.72. 
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simply means that for individuals with share of deductions equal to one, the indirect 
impact of broad income with respect to changes in net-of-tax rates is 0.11. 
 
Tax return data include rich information on incomes and deductions but limited 
socio-demographic information. As highlighted in the literature, the existence of 
heterogeneous income growth can cast doubt on the validity of the estimated 
results because such heterogeneous growth is not well understood. Controlling for 
income as an alternative to controlling for socio-demographic information is a 
common approach in the literature. Table B.5 presents results for specifications 
including five-piece income splines constructed from different lagged values of 
income. The results are similar to the ones obtained from the preferred 
specifications in Table 2.3. In all columns, the first stage F-statistic is large. Except 
for column 2, estimate for the direct impact of changes in net-of-tax rates are small, 
positive, and insignificant in all specifications. The estimate for the indirect effect 
of changes in net-of-tax rate is strongly significant in all specifications and is robust 





Table 2. 3: Second stage regression estimates from the IV regression with net-of-
tax rates and the interaction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) -0.319*** 0.0972 -0.137 
 (0.112) (0.201) (0.219) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉)) 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 
 (0.00666) (0.00705) (0.00682) 
Observations 16,184 16,184 16,184 
R-squared -0.052 -0.198 -0.112 
Instruments 0 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 2 3 4 lags 
Diff-in-Sargan p-val 0.0485 0.862 0.366 
First stage F-statistic 231, 3257 62, 3178 56, 3178 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity 





My last step of analysis includes examining the estimates with different 
difference lengths. Table B.7 presents such results and considers one-, two- and 
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three-year difference lengths.15 For the one-year differences specification, the 
estimate for the direct impact of changes in net-of-tax rates is 0.374 and is 
significant at the 10% level whereas the estimate for the indirect impact is strongly 
significant and is smaller (the magnitude is 0.07) compared to the ones from the 
previously discussed two-year differences specifications. In the case of three-year 
differences specification, the estimate for the direct impact is now negative (-0.997) 
and is significant at the 10% level of significance. The coefficient on the interaction 
term is significant at any conventional level and is slightly larger than the ones from 
the two-year differences specifications. The results are, in general, consistent with 
the previously obtained results and suggest much a smaller indirect impact as 
compared to the one in the prior literature. 
 
The estimated results from all the specifications support the claim that tax 
elasticity is not an exogenous parameter, rather it depends on the net of tax base. 
To better understand the behavioral responses, I run a join significance test for the 
coefficients on the net of tax rates and the interaction term. I find both the 
coefficients are jointly significant at 1% level of significance. I compute the total tax 
elasticity by plugging the values of 𝛄 in estimated coefficients. I find the tax 
elasticity at the average net of tax base as 0.12. Moreover, depending on the value 
of 𝛄, tax elasticity varies between 0.09 to 0.26. 
 
The estimated coefficient on the interaction term is largely different from that in 
Kopczuk (2005). One of the differences between Kopczuk’s model and the model 
used in my study is how the interaction term between the net-of-tax rates and the 
tax base is defined. I define the interaction as ∆ 𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑖 𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡)) whereas 
Kopczuk (2005) defines it as  ∆(𝛾𝑖 𝑡 ∗  𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑖 𝑡)). This means that there is a 
difference because of the scale change. However, to understand the other sources 
of differences, I estimate equation (2.3) using Kopczuk’s (2005) baseline 
specification and using his definition. Kopczuk (2005) uses three-years differences 
and his baseline specification includes instruments for net-of-tax rates and the 
interaction term based on base-year information. I start with his baseline 
specification and make changes to specifications to arrive at my specification with 
three-year differences (column 3 of Table B.7). Table 2.4 presents the estimated 
results for such an analysis. Column (1) presents estimates using Kopczuk’s 
(2005) specification and his definition of the interaction. This column includes 
instruments based on base-year income, two-year lagged income and three-year 
lagged income as well as income splines based on one-year lagged income. The 
estimate reported in his study for this specification is 0.79 whereas my replicated 





15 The number of observations is different for different columns in this table because I lose one 
additional year of observations for each additional year in the difference length. 
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estimate. However, it is noteworthy that the coefficient on the interaction term 





Table 2. 4: Understanding the sources of differences from Kopczuk (2005) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Net-of-tax rates -0.909*** -1.484 -4.665** 8.488 -1.205 
 (0.232) (0.910) (1.960) (9.374) (1.127) 
Interaction 
between tax rate 
and tax base 
0.295*** 0.623* 0.293* 0.092*** 0.087*** 
 (0.055) (0.349) (0.164) (0.020) (0.008) 
Observations 13,086 13,086 13,086 3,279 4,823 
R-squared 0.028 -0.083 -0.285 -4.343 -0.038 
Lags of income for 
constructing 
instruments 
0 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 2 3 4 lags 1 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 
Lags of income for 
constructing 
splines 
1 lag 1 lag 1 lag 1 lag No spline 
First stage F 
statistics 
101, 35 10, 19 7, 2 0.6, 2539 11, 3106 
Diff-in-Sargan p-val 0.324 0.493 0.0172 0.878 0.344 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 





Column (2) includes instruments based on one-, two-, three-year lagged 
income while keeping splines and other information unchanged from those of 
columns (1). Instruments are now more exogenous while first-stage F-statistics are 
still larger than the minimum value for 10% of OLS bias suggested by Stock and 
Yogo (2002). For this specification, the coefficient on the interaction term now 
increases to 0.623 and is significant at the 10% level of significance. Column (3) 
includes instruments based on two-, three- and four-year lagged income, as well 
as income splines based on one-year lagged income. However, the instruments 
are now weak. Column (4) uses the same specification as that in column (2) but 
uses the definition of the interaction term used in my study instead of the one used 
in Kopczuk (2005). Therefore, column (4) uses the same specification as in column 
(2) but a different definition of the interaction term and different sample. The 
coefficient is now much smaller. This suggests that much of the difference can be 
explained by the difference in the definition and the sample. The instruments are 
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now weak. Column (5) uses the instruments based on one-, two-, and three-year 
lagged income as well as the same definition of the interaction term as that in 
column (4) but does not include any income splines. The specification in this 
column is similar to that used in column (3) of Table B.7. The first stage F-statistics 
are now larger than the suggested minimum value. A comparison between 
columns (2) and (5) suggests that much of the difference is caused by the 
difference in the definition of the interaction term. However, looking at columns 1, 
2 and 3, it is also suggestive that the number of lags of income used to construct 
the instruments is also an important factor in determining the magnitude of the 
estimate. The coefficient largely varies as the number of lags to construct the 
instruments changes. Although the definitions of the interaction term are different, 
this difference should not matter when it comes to computing the overall elasticity. 
Having said that, the use of suitable instrument is needed for consistently 
estimating the elasticities. This implies that, because my estimation is based on 
plausibly more exogenous instruments, the results in my study provide some 






The present study revisits the direct and indirect impact of changes in tax rates 
using a recent estimation method. In most of the specifications, the estimate for 
the direct impact is of the order of 0 to 0.37 and is insignificant. On the other hand, 
the indirect impact is strongly significant (at the 1% level) for all the specifications 
considered. Its value is also very much consistent across specifications with the 
value ranging between 0.102-0.106 for the specifications with two-year 
differences. The estimated indirect impact is strongly significant in the case of 
specifications with one-year differences as well, however, its magnitude is smaller 
(0.07). Similar to all other specifications, the estimated indirect impact is significant 
at the 1% level in the case of three-year differences, but its magnitude (0.123) is 
slightly larger than that in two-year differences. The estimated direct impact is, in 
general, in line with the prior literature. However, the estimated indirect impact is 
largely different from that of the prior literature. Kopczuk (2005) reports a large 
indirect impact of the order of 0.7 to 0.8 implying large efficiency cost of taxation 
through tax base. However, my study provides strong evidence that the indirect 
efficiency cost of taxation may not necessarily be as large as suggested by the 
present literature. These findings imply that EBI is not an exogenous parameter, 
rather it depends on the tax base. These findings have significant implications on 
the efficiency cost of taxation. These findings imply that the tax base has an impact 
on the efficiency of taxation and, therefore, any analysis of the efficiency cost of 
taxation ignoring the tax base effect is incomplete. We need to take into account 

















Theoretical residential sorting models argue that individuals value local public 
services and therefore choose their residential location according to the public 
services available in geographical regions. Their choice reflects how they value 
public services available in those geographical regions. One such public service is 
school quality. Parents care about the education quality available in regions and 
this concern translates into higher values of residential property in those regions. 
However, increased competition for enrollment provides students with 
opportunities to transfer to the school of their choice without having to change their 
residence. Therefore, school choice weakens the link between school quality and 
residential property value. My study examines the connection between increased 
school competition and property values. Specifically, this study empirically 
examines the possible linkages between (1) school competition and the distribution 
of home prices within the county, and (2) school competition and median home 
prices. This study provides evidence that an increase in school competition is 
associated with an overall increase in home value within the county. Moreover, this 
study also provides evidence that an increase in school competition is associated 
with a decrease in variability in home values within the county, however, these 
findings are sensitive to fixed effects and time trends included in the specifications. 
 
This study proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 presents a conceptual framework 
for linkages between (1) school competition and the distribution of home prices 
within the county, and (2) school competition and median home prices; Section 3.3 
describes the existing literature; Section 3.4 describes the data used in the study; 
Section 3.5 presents the empirical methods; Section 3.6 presents the results 





3.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
Consider two school districts: a good school district and a bad one.16 The 
services from the good school district are more valuable to parents than those from 
the bad one. Initially, the state does not adopt open enrollment and thereby one’s 
school attendance zone is a hard default. In such a case, it is likely that home 
prices are higher in good school districts and lower in bad ones (Black 1999,; and 
Figlio and Lucas 2004). After the adoption of open enrollment, attendance zones 
are no longer relevant, and parents are no longer restricted to attendance zones. 
Parents now have the option to choose any school from the good and the bad 
school districts regardless of their residential locations. Because houses are more 
expensive and schools are better in good school districts, parents in a bad school 
district will maximize their utility by sending their children to the schools in the good 
district where services are better while continuing to live in the bad school district 
where houses are cheaper. The empirical analyses in this paper are based on the 
following assumptions: 
 
• Transportation costs to/from schools are negligible; 
• Families are well-informed about the exact services provided by the schools, 
recent school choice reform initiatives by the states and the home prices; 
• In the absence of school choice, the attendance zone is a hard default and 
difficult to opt out of; and 
• Alternatives to traditional public schools (magnet, charter and private schools) 
are as good as “good” public schools. 
 
The adoption of open enrollment is associated with the change in residential 
property value in the two districts. Residents in the bad school district are now 
enjoying better services provided by the schools in the good school district while 
maintaining the same residential area with cheaper house prices. This, in turn, 
implies that residences in the bad school district are now more valuable after the 
adoption of open enrollment than they were before the adoption of open 
enrollment. On the other hand, demand for homes in the good school district 
decreases after adoption of open enrollment. The changes in the relative valuation 
for homes between the two school districts will lead to changes in market prices 





16 Good and bad school districts are defined based on the aspects that the parents care about and 




to increase weakly17 whereas home prices in the good school district should 
decrease weakly. This relative change in home prices influences the distribution 
of home prices across two districts. In addition to affecting the relative home prices 
of the two districts, the adoption of open enrollment also increases the competition 
for enrollment among schools as parents now have the freedom to choose a school 
from neighboring districts as well. The adoption of open enrollment should, 
therefore, reduce the inequality in home prices across two districts and increase 
school competition. With adoption of open enrollment, the residents have more 
freedom of sending their children to the schools of their choice. Thus, overall 
satisfaction of the residents of the combined region of the two districts should 
increase, leading to an increase in overall home prices. 
 
This story extends to school choice among traditional public, charter, magnet, 
and private schools as well. The introduction of alternatives to traditional public 
school allows parents to choose a school among four different types of schools 
anywhere within the county and the relative home prices will be affected among 
the areas with varying school quality within the county in a similar manner as in the 
case of open enrollment. I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index18 (HHI) for 
enrollment among four different types of schools to represent school competition. 
A lower value of HHI is associated with less concentrated enrollment which in turn 
represents a greater choice for parents in selecting a school for their children and 
vice versa. I provide a precise definition of HHI in a later section. It might be 
possible that there is only one type of school within the county when the value of 
HHI is at its maximum of HHI=10000. The way HHI for enrollment is defined, the 
minimum concentration and thereby maximum choice might be possible when 
there is equal enrollment among all four types of schools and this case will be 
represented by HHI=4*25^2=2500. Based on the assumptions and conceptual 
analyses described above, the following hypotheses are drawn: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Less concentrated counties will have less variability in home prices. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If households value school choice, less concentrated counties will 







17 Quality of services at schools in a good school district as perceived by residents in a bad school 
district may be higher or equal to the perceived quality of services at schools in bad school districts. 
18 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is defined as the sum of squares of enrollment shares for four 
different types of schools within the county. 
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3.3 Literature Review 
 
Considering its importance, there has been a substantial discussion in the 
literature regarding the linkage between school quality and property values as well 
as other welfare measures. Black (1999) investigates parental valuation for good 
schools using a school attendance zone boundary approach. She uses a 
regression discontinuity design based on the data on both sides of school 
attendance zones in Massachusetts to estimate the impact of test scores on home 
prices. This study assumes that residential houses near the boundaries of school 
attendance zones are expected to have similar neighborhood characteristics 
thereby reducing the possibility of bias resulting from omitted neighborhood 
characteristics. Her results show that a one percent increase in test scores results 
in a 0.5 percent increase in home prices. Figlio and Lucas (2004) address the 
question of whether the state-administered grades assigned to schools have any 
influence on house prices as well as on residential location. They use data on 
repeated sales on individual residential properties in Florida and found that school 
grades impact house prices and residential locations, however, they also found 
that these estimated effects diminish over time. Dhar and Ross (2012) address a 
similar question by examining differences across school district boundaries rather 
than those across attendance zones. Based on the data from Connecticut, they 
found a significant positive effect of test scores on property values. Reback (2005) 
examines the effect of public-school choice reforms on house prices. Using data 
on inter-district choice from Minnesota, he finds that school districts with the net 
exit of students to neighboring districts experience home price increases whereas 
net student inflow is associated with a decrease in home prices. His estimation 
results show that the magnitude of the effect for student outflow is larger than the 
magnitude of the effect for student inflow. Based on this comparison he concludes 
that the net welfare impact of the expansion of school choice is positive, even 
though the difference between the magnitudes of effects for incoming and outgoing 
transfer rates is not statistically significant. Other related works include those by 
Brunner et al., (2012), Schwartz et al., (2014) and Chung (2015). These related 
papers, in general, investigate the effects of outflow and inflow of students, as a 
result of school choice reforms, on the residential property value as well as on the 
residential location. They find that the effect of the expanded school choice on low 
performing geographical regions (as defined by school districts or school zones) is 
positive and vice versa. 
 
There are a few companion studies in the literature that are most relevant for 
my study. For example, Reback (2005) addresses the question of school choice 
reform and evaluates the expanded school choice in terms of effects for inflow and 
outflow of students. Other related works by Brunner et al., (2012), Schwartz et al., 
(2014) and Chung (2015) also follow Reback (2005) by evaluating school choice 
in terms of the effects of inflow and outflow of students on home value. Reback 
(2005) and Brunner et al., (2012) find that initially “low-quality” districts experience 
a net outflow of students and an increase in home value whereas initially “high-
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quality” districts experience a net inflow of students and a decrease in home value. 
These patterns of student mobility, in turn, reduce the inequality of home values. 
None of these studies explicitly investigate and empirically test a direct relation 
between school choice and the inequality of home prices. Moreover, the findings 
from these studies are based on smaller geographical regions. There is no 
evidence that the findings from these studies based on smaller geographic regions 
generalize to the entire country. My study adds to the literature by examining the 
relationships between (1) school competition and the distribution of home prices 
within the county, and (2) school competition and median home prices. In addition, 
in contrast to the previous literature, I utilize data representing the entire country. 
A strong set of control variables on demographic as well as housing characteristics 
is utilized to estimate the model. Utilizing county-level data, this study provides 
evidence that an expanded school competition is associated with an increase in 
home value. Moreover, this study also provides evidence that an expanded school 
competition is associated with a decrease in variability in home value within a 
county, however, this finding is sensitive to sample size and to controls for 





The dataset for this study includes county-level panel data for four years (2010, 
2012, 2014 and 2016) with 819 counties from all over the US. Data are collected 
from two different sources: the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 
and American Community Survey (ACS) by the U.S. Census Bureau.19 Data 
collected from NCES are school-level data on enrollment into all traditional public, 
charter, magnet and private schools. These school-level data on enrollment are 
then used to compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for enrollment among 





19 Data are collected from the following tables: 
U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey, 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year 
Estimates, Tables s2506, CP04 and DP05; generated using American FactFinder; 
<http://factfinder2.census.gov>; (11 May 2019) 
U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey, 2012 American Community Survey 1-Year 
Estimates, Tables s2506, CP04 and DP05; generated using American FactFinder; 
<http://factfinder2.census.gov>; (11 May 2019) 
U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey, 2014 American Community Survey 1-Year 
Estimates, Tables s2506, CP04 and DP05; generated using American FactFinder; 
<http://factfinder2.census.gov>; (11 May 2019) 
U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey, 2016 American Community Survey 1-Year 
Estimates, Tables s2506, CP04 and DP05; generated using American FactFinder; 
<http://factfinder2.census.gov>; (11 May 2019) 
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observations are converted into county-level data. The HHI measure serves as a 
proxy for school competition within each county. HHI for school enrollment is 
defined as: 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑠2𝑖                                                 (3.1) 
 
Here 𝑖 represents the type of school and 𝑠 represents the share of enrollment 
for school type. Based on the definition of HHI for enrollment, HHI is bounded 
between a minimum of 2500 and a maximum of 10000. A lower value of HHI 
represents less concentrated enrollment which further implies a greater choice for 
parents in selecting a school for their children and vice versa. 
 
Data on home value and other socio-demographic information are collected 
from three different tables (s2506, CP04, and DP05) of ACS 1-year estimates by 
U.S. Census Bureau. The unit of observation for each of these data tables is the 
county. Table DP04 contains the distributional data on home prices, among other 
information. These distributional data have been used to construct the Gini 
coefficient for home values. Gini coefficient for home value is a measure of 
dispersion for home value within the county and is one of the two dependent 
variables of interest. The definition of the Gini coefficient is given in equation (3.2). 
 











                                                    (3.2) 
 
In the above definition, 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 are individual home values. There are certain 
advantages of Gini coefficient that makes it a preferred choice over other 
measures (standard deviation or variance) to represent dispersion. First, Gini 
coefficient is a more generalized form of measure for dispersion. Moreover, it is 
not only invariant to the scale of observations but also bounded. One can analyze 
extreme cases (Gini=0 representing perfect equality and Gini=10,000 representing 
perfect inequality) with the help of Gini coefficient which is not possible using other 
measures. In this study, Gini coefficient for home value is bounded20 between a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 10,000. Table for data on HHI from NCES and 
all three tables from ACS contain county names and state names. The combination 
of county and state names is unique in each dataset. This unique combination of 





20 To maintain consistency in scale with other variables expressed in percentages, Gini Coefficient 
is measured in percentage squares and bounded between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 
10,000. This scale of the Gini coefficient used in this paper contrasts the conventional value of Gini 
coefficient bounded between 0 and 1. 
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single merged data set. The summary statistics for the combined data set are 
shown in Table C.1. 
 
 
3.5 Estimation Method 
 
Figures 1-4 provide a visualization of the linkages examined in this study. 
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the unconditional relation between HHI and the median 
home price for 2010 and 2016 respectively. These two figures display a weakly 
discernable negative correlation between the two variables.  Figure 3 and 4 show 
scatter plots for the relation between school competition and the Gini coefficient of 
home prices for 2010 and 2016 respectively. These two scatter plots display a very 
subtle positive relation between school competition and the inequality of home 
prices.21 
 
To provide empirical evidence concerning whether these relations hold, I 
estimate the following equation (3.3) with Pooled OLS regression: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                          (3.3) 
 
In the equation (3.3), 𝑌𝑖  represents two dependent variables of interest: median 
home prices and variability of home prices as measured by the Gini coefficient for 
home prices. The independent variable of interest is HHI and the coefficient of 
interest is 𝛽1. X represents a vector of control variables. This set of controls include 






21 Years 2012 and 2014 are not displayed for brevity. However, the scatter plots for those two years 




































As reported in the literature, one of the challenges in estimating the 
capitalization effect of school competition on home value arises because the 
school competition may be correlated with unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics such as crime rate, other public services available within the 
geographical unit, demographic compositions, etc. Although the dataset includes 
a rich set of sociodemographic control variables, regressing the property values 
on other independent and control variables can result in biased estimates because 
of such correlation between the school competition and unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics. Such unobserved neighborhood characteristics that are invariant 
with respect to time for a geographical unit can be removed for by adding 
geographical unit-specific fixed effects. The estimation equation including such 
fixed effects is as below: 
 
𝑌𝑖 𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛽1 ∗ ℎℎ𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡                            (3.4) 
 
In equation (3.4), 𝜃𝑖 represents county-specific time-invariant effects. In the 
following sections, I estimate equation (3.4) using both fixed effects and random 
effects model and compare the results. 
 
Estimates including county-specific fixed effects rely on the assumption that 
there are no inter-county movements for attending schools. However, it is 
reasonably likely that parents living near the border of two counties may want to 
send their children to a school located outside of their own county of residence in 
order for their children to obtain better schooling. In this case, the identification 
assumption is violated. To address this concern, I extend the analysis by including 
metropolitan area-specific fixed effects instead of county-specific fixed effects. For 
such analysis, equation (3.4) is estimated, however, in this case,  𝜃𝑖 represents 
metropolitan area-specific time-invariant fixed effects. These estimates 
considering metropolitan area fixed effects remain valid if students do not attend a 
school located outside of their own metropolitan area of residence. 
 
Including county-specific fixed effects controls for time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics of counties. However, concerns remain about the unobserved 
characteristics that change over time, where county-specific fixed effects are 
unable to absorb such unobserved characteristics. These unobserved time-
varying characteristics can also lead to bias in the estimates. To address such 
concern, I test the robustness of estimates by relaxing the assumption of time 
invariance in the characteristics of geographical units and by absorbing any linear 
time-varying unobserved characteristics by including county-specific linear time 
trends in the estimation. With county-specific linear time trends, the estimation 
equation takes the following form: 
 







3.6.1 The Effect of School Competition on Median Home Value 
 
Table 3.1 presents the estimates for the effect of school competition on median 
home prices. Column 1 includes estimates from Pooled OLS regression without 
any control variables. The coefficient on HHI is -16.06 and is significant at the 1% 
level. The estimated results suggest that for one unit decrease in concentration 
(∆HHI = -1), home price increases by 16.06 dollars which is 0.01 % at the median. 
The estimated coefficient on HHI in equation (3.3) using Pooled OLS including 
control variables is -5.251 (column 2). The point estimate is significant at the 1% 
level. This result suggests that one unit decrease in HHI is associated with an 
increase in home value by $5.25 which is a 0.003% at the median. To interpret this 
result, consider the case when a county goes from fully concentrated enrollment 
(HHI=10000 with no competition for school enrollment) to fully unconcentrated 
enrollment (HHI=0 with maximum school competition). This means that initially the 
county does not adopt open enrollment in which case the attendance zone is a 
hard default and difficult to opt-out of and there is no school competition, and then 
the county adopts an open enrollment in which case the student is fully flexible to 
choose any school within that county and the school competition is maximum. 
Such a change in enrollment is associated with an increase in home value by 
$52,510. This increase in home value represents a 26.50% increase at the median.  
 
The OLS estimate in column 2 relies on the assumption that the unobserved 
error is uncorrelated with school competition which is very strong assumption. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the estimates using fixed effects and random effects 
models respectively recognizing county-specific fixed effects. My preferred 
specification is fixed effects model. The underlying assumption for the random 
effects model is that county specific unobserved characteristics are uncorrelated 
with HHI which is very strong assumption. Although the dataset contains socio-
demographic information, variables included in the dataset may not be sufficient 
to absorb the unobserved county specific characteristics. If the county specific 
unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with HHI, the random effects model will 
produce inconsistent estimates. Fixed effects model relaxes such assumption and 
can produce consistent estimate when HHI is correlated with unobserved 
heterogeneity.  Hausman test results also suggest that the fixed effects model is 
appropriate (p-value from the Hausman test is 0). Column 3 presents the estimated 
results from fixed effects model. The coefficient on HHI of school enrollment is -
2.999 and is significant at the 1% level. These estimates support the hypothesis 
that a decrease in concentration is associated with an increase in home value 
where a one unit decrease in concentration of enrollment is associated with an 







Table 3. 1: Estimates for regression of home value using full sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





HHI -16.06*** -5.251*** -2.999*** -4.924*** 
 (1.304) (0.580) (0.676) (0.629) 
Observations 3,250 3,165 3,165 3,165 
R-squared 0.050 0.891 0.433  
Number of counties   819 819 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 
coefficients on control variables are not listed in this (and subsequent) table 





A careful examination of the values of HHI for enrollments shows that not every 
panel unit has enough within-county variation in HHI across years. To avoid the 
fact that panel units with low within-county variation may affect the estimates and 
to confirm that the results are based on enough variation in HHI across years, I 
identify the counties for the largest 50 percent within-county variation in absolute 
value in HHI across years and create a new sample of observations which 
experience the largest 50 percent swing in within-county variation in HHI across 
years. This limited sample consists of a balanced panel data set for 669 counties. 
The results based on this limited sample are shown in Table 3.2. With the new 
limited sample, the sign of the coefficients on HHI from Pooled OLS, fixed effects 
as well as random effects models remains unchanged (negative) and are, 
therefore, in agreement with the hypothesis. The estimates from all the 
specifications are precise at the 5% or lower level of significance.22 
 
The estimates presented so far rely on the assumption that the observations 
are homoscedastic. However, Breusch-Pagan as well as White test for 
heteroskedasticity suggests a strong rejection of no heteroskedasticity. To 
examine the direction and magnitude of the coefficients and the magnitude of 





22 The data fail to meet the asymptotic assumption for Hausman Test, so it is not possible to 
determine which model is appropriate. 
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estimates are obtained considering clusters at the county level. Columns 1-3 of 
Table 3.3 present heteroskedasticity-robust estimates. Consistent with previously 
estimated coefficients, the sign of the coefficients is unchanged suggesting that a 
decrease in the concentration of enrollments is associated with an increase in 
home value. The coefficients from Pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects 





Table 3. 2: Estimates for regression of home value using limited sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No Control OLS - Controlled FE RE 
HHI -15.81*** -4.838*** -2.287** -4.555*** 
 (1.996) (0.839) (0.896) (0.797) 
Observations 1,627 1,591 1,591 1,591 
R-squared 0.046 0.898 0.437  
Number of counties   669 669 





Heteroskedasticity-robust estimates with clusters at the county levels are also 
obtained with the limited sample of 669 counties that have the largest 50 percent 
swing in within-county variation in HHI across years. The results based on this 
limited sample are shown in Table C.2. With the new limited sample, coefficients 
from Pooled OLS and fixed effects models are -4.838 and -2.287 respectively and 





Table 3. 3: Estimates for regression of home value using full sample with 
cluster at county level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS FE RE 
HHI -5.251*** -2.999*** -4.924*** 
 (0.919) (0.700) (0.765) 
Observations 3,165 3,165 3,165 
R-squared 0.891 0.433  
Number of counties  819 819 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the county are in 







The estimates presented so far include fixed effects at the county level. The 
estimates considering county-specific fixed effects rely on the assumption that 
students attend schools within the county of their residence. However, it is possible 
that parents near the border of two counties send their children to a school on the 
other side of the border in order for their children to obtain better schooling. In such 
a case, the identification assumption is violated. I address this concern by re-
estimating equation (3.4) including metropolitan area-specific fixed effects instead 
of county-specific fixed effects. The estimates are shown in Table 3.4. The results 
reiterate the negative relation between the concentration of enrollments and home 
value. Specifically, the coefficient on HHI of enrollments from OLS and random 
effects are -2.581 and -2.934 respectively and are significant at the 5% and 1% 
levels respectively. 
 
The final step of analysis involves including county-specific linear time trends. 
Fixed effects included in the previous estimates are time-invariant and are, 
therefore, unable to absorb any characteristics that change over time. County-
specific linear time trend can absorb unobserved county-specific characteristics 
that vary linearly over time. Such estimated coefficients of equation (3.5) are 
presented in Table C.3. Consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient on HHI of 
enrollment is again negative. However, the coefficient is now imprecise at the 10% 
level. The fact that the estimates are imprecise when I absorb county specific linear 






Table 3. 4: Estimates for regression of home value with metropolitan 
area level data (clustered at metro level) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS FE RE 
HHI of school enrollment -2.581** -0.916 -2.934*** 
 (1.221) (1.070) (1.041) 
Constant 309,039** 77,235 6,793 
 (132,142) (133,374) (98,197) 
Observations 1,327 1,327 1,327 
R-squared 0.881 0.328  
Number of Metro Area  383 383 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the 







3.6.2 Effect of School Competition on Gini Coefficients of Home Prices 
 
The estimated coefficient for the effect of school competition on the inequality 
of home prices are shown in Table 3.5. The results in this table assume 
homogeneity in the unobserved errors. Column 1 represents the estimates from 
Pooled OLS regression without any control variables. The estimated coefficient on 
HHI of school enrollment in this specification is 0.0330 and is significant at the 1% 
level. Column 2 presents coefficients in equation (3.3) using Pooled OLS 
regression including the full set of control variables. The estimate of interest is -
0.0179 which is significant at the 5% level of significance. Results shown in 
columns 3 and 4 recognize county-specific fixed effects. Although I report 
estimates from random effects model, my preferred specification is fixed effects 
model. Hausman test also suggest that the fixed effects model is appropriate. The 
coefficient on the HHI of school enrollment in the fixed effects model is 0.0392 and 
is significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient from the fixed effects model 
supports the hypothesis and suggests that going from fully unrestricted enrollment 
(HHI=0) to fully restricted enrollment (HHI=10000) increases the variability by 
6.09% at the median. 
 
As in the case of analysis for median home value, I identify the counties with 
enough variation across years. This new sample includes 669 counties with the 
largest mere 50 percent within-county variation in absolute value in HHI across 
years. The results based on this limited sample are shown in Table C.4. Although 
the sign of coefficient from Pooled OLS now changes to negative, the sign of the 
coefficient from the preferred fixed effects model remains unchanged (positive), 
thereby, supporting the hypothesis that an increase in competition is associated 
with a decrease in inequality of home prices. 
 
The specifications in Table C.5 relax the assumption of homoskedasticity and 
present heteroskedasticity-robust estimates considering clusters at the county 
levels.  The sign of the coefficient on HHI in the preferred fixed effects model is 
positive which is in line with the findings in the previous tables. The coefficient is 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
Heteroskedasticity-robust estimates based on the limited sample with clusters 
at the county levels are also obtained. These estimates are presented in Table 
C.6. Similar to Table C.5, the Pooled OLS estimates contrast the hypothesis 
whereas estimates from the preferred fixed effects model are in agreement with 







Table 3. 5: Estimates for regression of Gini-coefficient of home value using full 
sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No Control OLS FE RE 
HHI 0.0330*** -0.0179** 0.0392*** 0.0168* 
 (0.0112) (0.00805) (0.0129) (0.00970) 
Observations 3,250 3,165 3,165 3,165 
R-squared 0.009 0.705 0.150  
Number of conuties   819 819 





To address the concern discussed in a previous section, estimates are 
obtained by using metropolitan area level observations and including metropolitan 
area fixed effects in the estimating equation. Table 3.6 includes such estimates 
with metropolitan areas as units of observations. The coefficients from Pooled 
OLS, fixed effects as well as random effects specifications are now positive 
suggesting that a decrease in concentration is associated with a decrease in 
variability in home prices within the metropolitan area. The coefficients from fixed 
effects and random effects models are significant at the 10% level of significance 





Table 3. 6: Estimates for regression of Gini-coefficient of home value 
with metropolitan level data (clustered at metro level) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS FE RE 
HHI of school enrollment 0.000723 0.0289* 0.0234* 
 (0.0145) (0.0171) (0.0133) 
Constant 11,427*** 8,908*** 11,660*** 
 (1,637) (2,366) (1,552) 
Observations 1,327 1,327 1,327 
R-squared 0.669 0.171  
Number of metro areas  383 383 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the 







As for the final step of the robustness check, the estimates considering county-
specific linear time trend are obtained and shown in Table C.7. Consistent with the 
hypothesis and with findings from previously presented specifications, the 
coefficient is still positive suggesting that as school competition increases, home 
prices become less dispersed. However, the coefficient is now imprecise at any 
conventional level of significance. 
 
 
3.6.3 Understanding the Driving Force in the Composition of HHI 
 
So far, I have examined the response for a change in HHI as a measure of 
school competition on home values and the inequality of home value. In general, I 
find that an increase in school competition increases home values and decreases 
the inequality of home values. However, this analysis does not provide any 
information regarding the relative magnitude of driving forces within the 
composition of HHI. HHI has been constructed based on four different types of 
schools: public, charter, magnet and private. Each of the four types of school is 
different in terms of quality of services provided, and therefore, each type of school 
may have different driving forces on the overall response. To better understand 
how each type of school affects home values and the inequality of home values, I 
regress home values and the inequality of home values on the share of total 
enrolment for private, charter and magnet school categories along with other 
independent variables using fixed effects model. The estimates are presented in 
Table 3.7. Column (1) presents the estimates for the regression of median home 
values on the share of enrolment in each category. The coefficients on all three 
shares are positive and significant. The coefficient on the share of enrolments of 
the charter school is more prominent than the coefficients for the other categories. 
This is suggestive that charter school is the most prominent in explaining the 
variation in home values as compared to other categories. Column (2) presents 
the estimates for the regression of the Gini-coefficient of home values on the share 
of enrolments in each category. The coefficients on all three shares are negative, 
however, the coefficient on the share of enrolment of the magnet school is 
significant at the 10% level whereas the other two coefficients are insignificant. 
These results are indicative that magnet school has an impact in reducing the 








Table 3. 7: Understanding the variation in the composition of enrolment in 
HHI 




of home values 
Share of enrolment of charter school 787.7** -2.227 
 (316.7) (4.987) 
Share of enrolment of magnet school 239.2*** -4.870*** 
 (84.06) (1.659) 
Share of enrolment of private school 599.5** -6.130 
 (247.6) (4.988) 
Observations 3,165 3,165 
R-squared 0.434 0.151 
Number of counties 819 819 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by county in parentheses. 







My study examines the connection between the expansion of school 
competition and property values. Specifically, this study empirically examines the 
possible linkages between (1) school competition and the distribution of home 
prices, and (2) school competition and median home prices. Utilizing county-level 
data from all 50 states across the United States, this study provides evidence that 
an increase in school competition is associated with an increase in home value. 
Moreover, this study also provides evidence that an expansion of school 
competition is associated with a decrease in variability in home value, however, 
both findings are sensitive to fixed effects and time trends included in the 
specifications. My findings add to the prediction from the existing literature. Reback 
(2005) and Brunner et al., (2012) establish a loose connection between the 
variability of home prices and school competition using inflow and outflow of 
students. Predictions from both studies suggest a reduction in inequality of home 
prices for a greater school competition. The finding from my study adds to the 
findings from these studies by providing evidence that those predictions hold in the 
context of  nationally representative data. Moreover, the findings from this study 
support the hypothesis that an increase in school competition is associated with 
an increase in home prices and vice versa. Furthermore, I find the relative 
magnitudes of the driving forces among different types of schools. My findings 
provide evidence that the share of enrolment of the charter school is most 
prominent in determining the home values whereas the share of enrolment of the 
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magnet school is the only statistically significant factor in explaining the inequality 
in home values. These results provide some evidence that the market as a whole 
values expanded school competition. Whereas the results from my study support 
a linkage between school competition and home values, these results should be 
interpreted with caution because these results are inconclusive and sensitive to 
specifications. Results are significant when I include time-invariant county fixed 
effects. However, the estimates are imprecise when I absorb county-specific linear 
time trends. These findings are suggestive that school competition may be 
correlated with the unobserved linear time trend. Perhaps the growth of wealth of 
a county, which can be a determinant of home prices, may increase the demand 
for better schooling thereby affecting the school competition, or maybe, other time-
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A Appendix for Chapter 1 
 
Table A. 1: Descriptive statistics 
 (2) (3) (5) (6) (8) (9) 
 1983 1983-88 1988 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Broad income 51,861.23 45,917.04 52,783.29 53,953.10 55,278.36 79,150.78 
Taxable income 36,278.10 37,490.10 36,901.19 46,063.13 39,679.14 71,014.75 
Federal tax rate 24.83 7.27 23.49 7.45 20.79 6.65 
State tax rate 4.65 3.25 4.49 3.09 4.34 2.84 
Single 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 
Married 0.71 0.45 0.70 0.46 0.68 0.47 
No dependent 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.50 
One dependent 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 
Two dependents 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 
Three dependents 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.23 
Under age 65 & not blind 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.29 
One person over age 65 or 
blind 
0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23 




Table A. 2: First stage estimates for Weber’s baseline 
specification in column 1 of Table 1.1 
 (1) 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) 














First stage F-statistic 121.75 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 

























Table A. 3: First stage estimates for columns 2-4 of Table 1.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Column 2 of Table 1.1 Column 3 of Table 1.1 Column 4 of Table 1.1 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 0 𝑙𝑎𝑔
) 0.72*** -0.03     
 (0.02) (0.02)     
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.01 0.03* 0.11*** 0.02 0.15*** 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.03* -0.02 0.11*** -0.03 0.12*** -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 0 𝑙𝑎𝑔
) 0.36*** 0.21***     
 (0.02) (0.03)     
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) -0.06*** 0.14*** -0.02 0.14*** 0.02 0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) -0.03 0.12*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.02 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
)   0.21*** 0.02   
   (0.02) (0.02)   
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
)   0.10*** 0.15***   
   (0.02) (0.02)   
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔
)     0.10*** 0.04** 
     (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
)     0.02 0.10*** 
     (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 24,731 24,731 24,731 24,731 24,731 24,731 
R-squared 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A. 4: First stage estimates for Table 1.2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
) 0.20*** 0.02 0.16*** -0.00 0.18*** -0.01 0.19*** 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.12*** 0.02 0.08*** -0.00 0.10*** 0.00 0.09*** -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.11*** -0.02 0.08*** -0.04** 0.10*** -0.04* 0.10*** -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
) 0.09*** 0.16*** 0.05** 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) -0.01 0.13*** -0.05** 0.11*** -0.03 0.11*** -0.03 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.01 0.12*** -0.03 0.10*** -0.01 0.11*** -0.01 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 24,007 
R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 




Table A. 5: First stage estimates for Table 1.3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Column 1 of Table 1.3 Column 2 of Table 1.3 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
) 0.10*** -0.02 0.19*** 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.02 0.02 0.09*** -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.05 -0.05 0.07*** -0.06** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
) 0.09** 0.04 0.04 0.16*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) -0.04 0.10** -0.05 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) -0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 10,984 10,984 13,747 13,747 
R-squared 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.07 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 

























Table A. 6: First stage estimates for Table 1.4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Single Single Married Married 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.27*** -0.01 0.18*** 0.04* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.04 0.01 0.12*** 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.13** -0.05 0.09*** -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
) 0.17*** 0.10 0.08*** 0.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) -0.05 0.16** 0.00 0.12*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) -0.02 0.14** 0.02 0.11*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) 
Observations 6,198 6,198 17,202 17,202 
R-squared 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.06 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A. 7: First stage estimates for Table 1.5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Column 1 
of Table 1.5 
Column 1 of 
Table 1.5 
Column 2 of 
Table 1.5 
Column 2 of 
Table 1.5 
Column 3 of 
Table 1.5 
Column 3 of 
Table 1.5 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡) ∆𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜏𝑡+1) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.21*** 0.02 0.17*** -0.01 0.18*** -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.11*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.11*** -0.03 0.08*** -0.05** 0.09*** -0.04** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔
) 0.09*** 0.16*** 0.05** 0.13*** 0.06** 0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) -0.01 0.13*** -0.05* 0.11*** -0.03 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆ln (1 − 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑠
) 0.00 0.12*** -0.03 0.10*** -0.02 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 24,937 24,663 24,937 24,663 24,937 24,663 
R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.05 




B Appendix for Chapter 2 
 
Table B. 1: Descriptive statistics 
 (2) (3) (5) (6) (8) (9) 
 1983 1983-88 1988 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Broad income 52,925.09 41,374.39 58,895.28 50,764.16 68,318.12 75,087.10 
Taxable income 36,008.49 34,458.23 40,279.93 43,225.07 48,186.69 66,843.28 
Federal tax rate 24.14 8.33 23.86 8.15 21.62 7.02 
State tax rate 4.56 3.30 4.57 3.17 4.52 2.92 
Net of tax base 22.83 15.28 24.23 14.15 22.40 12.12 
Single 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 
Married 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.40 0.80 0.40 
No dependent 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.50 
One dependent 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 
Two dependents 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43 
Three dependents 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26 
Under age 65 & not blind 0.89 0.31 0.91 0.28 0.92 0.27 
One person over age 65 or 
blind 
0.07 0.26 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21 






Table B. 2: First stage regression estimates for Table 2.1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸) 
∆ ln 𝛾𝑝 0 𝑙𝑎𝑔 0.67***   
 (0.22)   
∆ ln 𝛾𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔 0.18 0.54 0.74** 
 (0.38) (0.48) (0.35) 
∆ ln 𝛾𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔 0.08 0.13 -0.53 
 (0.34) (0.36) (0.35) 
∆ ln 𝛾𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔  0.26  
  (0.37)  
∆ ln 𝛾𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔   0.72*** 
   (0.09) 
Observations 2,226 2,226 2,226 
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the 






















Table B. 3: First stage regression estimates for Table 2.2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝜸) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟎 𝒍𝒂𝒈)  0.68*** 0.22***     
  (0.02) (0.08)     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈)  0.10*** 0.04 0.20*** 0.11 0.25*** 0.09 
  (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈)  0.02 -0.26*** 0.10*** -0.21** 0.10*** -0.23*** 
  (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) 
∆ ln 𝛾𝑝 0 𝑙𝑎𝑔 0.99*** 0.01 0.99***     
 (0.09) (0.02) (0.09)     
∆ ln 𝛾𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.47** 
 (0.18) (0.04) (0.18) (0.05) (0.25) (0.04) (0.19) 
∆ ln 𝛾𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.09* -0.47 
 (0.18) (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) (0.19) (0.05) (0.30) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈)    0.25*** -0.04   
    (0.02) (0.08)   
∆ ln 𝛾𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔    0.01 0.73***   
    (0.05) (0.23)   
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟒 𝒍𝒂𝒈)      0.17*** 0.04 
      (0.02) (0.08) 
∆ ln 𝛾𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔      0.09* 0.90*** 
      (0.05) (0.27) 
Observations 16,184 16,184 16,184 16,184 16,184 16,184 16,184 
R-squared 0.85 0.17 0.85 0.10 0.85 0.09 0.85 




Table B. 4: First stage regression estimates for Table 2.3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Column 1 of Table 2.3 Column 2 of Table 2.3 Column 3 of Table 2.3 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟎 𝒍𝒂𝒈) 0.66*** -0.10     
 (0.03) (0.14)     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈) 0.09** 0.16 0.18*** 0.18 0.24*** -0.13 
 (0.05) (0.23) (0.06) (0.31) (0.05) (0.25) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈) 0.04 -0.16 0.12** -0.16 0.19*** 0.42 
 (0.05) (0.23) (0.05) (0.24) (0.06) (0.35) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 0 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟎 𝒍𝒂𝒈)) 0.01 1.00***     
 (0.02) (0.10)     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈)) 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.47** 
 (0.04) (0.21) (0.05) (0.29) (0.04) (0.22) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈)) -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 0.04 -0.09* -0.56* 
 (0.04) (0.20) (0.04) (0.22) (0.05) (0.34) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈)   0.24*** -0.53*   
   (0.05) (0.28)   
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈))   0.01 0.74***   
   (0.05) (0.27)   
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟒 𝒍𝒂𝒈)     0.08 -0.78** 
     (0.05) (0.33) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 4 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟒 𝒍𝒂𝒈))     0.09* 0.99*** 
     (0.05) (0.31) 
Observations 16,184 16,184 16,184 16,184 16,184 16,184 
R-squared 0.17 0.80 0.10 0.80 0.09 0.80 











Table B. 5: Second stage regression estimates for the sensitivity of income 
controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) 0.111 1.155*** 0.253 0.152 
 (0.201) (0.365) (0.265) (0.250) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉)) 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 
 (0.00712) (0.00783) (0.00713) (0.00710) 
Observations 16,003 16,003 16,003 16,003 
R-squared -0.203 -0.630 -0.241 -0.206 
Instruments 1 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 
Diff-in-Sargan p-val 0.882 0.698 0.869 0.899 
First stage F-
statistic 
61, 3239 24, 3354 32, 3221 35, 3171 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity clustered 















Table B. 6: First stage estimates for Table B.5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 

















∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈) 0.24*** -0.50* 0.16*** -0.76*** 0.19*** -0.59** 0.22*** -0.53* 
 (0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.28) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈) 0.18*** 0.17 0.11** -0.04 0.14** 0.10 0.13** 0.10 
 (0.06) (0.31) (0.06) (0.30) (0.06) (0.30) (0.06) (0.31) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈) 0.11** -0.19 0.07 -0.27 0.09* -0.20 0.09* -0.20 
 (0.05) (0.24) (0.05) (0.25) (0.05) (0.24) (0.05) (0.24) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈)) 0.02 0.75*** 0.03 0.80*** 0.02 0.77*** 0.01 0.75*** 
 (0.05) (0.27) (0.04) (0.26) (0.04) (0.27) (0.05) (0.27) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈)) 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.29) (0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.29) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈)) -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.22) (0.04) (0.22) (0.04) (0.22) (0.04) (0.22) 
Observations 16,003 16,003 16,003 16,003 16,003 16,003 16,003 16,003 
R-squared 0.10 0.80 0.15 0.80 0.11 0.80 0.11 0.80 




Table B. 7: Second stage regression estimates for IV regressions with different 
difference lengths 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 1-year diff 2-year diff 3-year diff 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 0.374*   
 (0.223)   
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉))1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 0.0682***   
 (0.00605)   
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓  0.0972  
  (0.201)  
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉))2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓  0.106***  
  (0.00705)  
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉)3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓   -0.997* 
   (0.570) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝝉))3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓   0.123*** 
   (0.00811) 
Observations 21,024 16,184 12,221 
R-squared -0.272 -0.198 -0.072 
Instruments 1 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 1 2 3 lags 
Diff-in-Sargan p-val 0.237 0.862 0.817 
First stage F-statistic 40, 4392 62, 3278 23, 2275 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the individual are in 
parentheses. The first-stage F-statistics in this table adjust for heteroscedasticity 




Table B. 8: First stage estimates for Table B.7 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Column 1 of Table B.7 Column 2 of Table B.7 Column 3 of Table B.7 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈)1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 0.20*** -0.54**     
 (0.05) (0.23)     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈)1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 0.14*** -0.04     
 (0.05) (0.25)     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈)1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 0.12*** -0.10     
 (0.04) (0.25)     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈))1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
-0.03 0.53**     
 (0.04) (0.21)     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈))1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
0.01 0.22     
 (0.04) (0.23)     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈))1−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
0.03 0.18     
 (0.04) (0.24)     
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈)2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓   0.24*** -0.29   








Table B.8: First stage estimates for Table B.7 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Column 1 of Table B.7 Column 2 of Table B.7 Column 3 of Table B.7 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈)2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓   0.18*** -0.42   
   (0.06) (0.41)   
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈)2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓   0.12** 0.33   
   (0.05) (0.31)   
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈))2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
  0.01 0.22   
   (0.05) (0.30)   
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈))2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
  0.02 0.62   
   (0.05) (0.38)   
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈))2−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
  -0.03 -0.41   
   (0.04) (0.28)   
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈)3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓     0.12*** -0.01 












Table B.8: First stage estimates for Table B.7 (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Column 1 of Table B.7 Column 2 of Table B.7 Column 3 of Table B.7 
 ∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉) ∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉)) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈)3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓     0.06 -0.46 
     (0.05) (0.54) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝟏 − 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈)3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓     0.03 0.34 
     (0.04) (0.32) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 1 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟏 𝒍𝒂𝒈))3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
    -0.01 0.12 
     (0.04) (0.39) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 2 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟐 𝒍𝒂𝒈))3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
    -0.01 0.50 
     (0.05) (0.51) 
∆𝑙𝑛(𝛾𝑝 3 𝑙𝑎𝑔 ∗ (𝟏
− 𝝉𝒑 𝟑 𝒍𝒂𝒈))3−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
    0.02 -0.28 
     (0.03) (0.28) 
Observations 21,024 21,024 16,184 16,057 12,233 11,769 
R-squared 0.05 0.82 0.10 0.27 0.06 0.22 




C Appendix for Chapter 3 
 
 
Table C. 1: Summary statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Median home value 198,156 108,921 
Gini Coefficient of Home Value 6,438 919.7 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of school enrollment 7,942 1,430 
Total housing units 135,037 219,430 
Percent of occupied units 88.09 6.551 
Percent of structure with 1 unit detached 65.94 11.09 
Percent of structures with 1 unit attached 5.109 5.210 
Percent of structures with 2 units 3.565 3.121 
Percent of structures with 3 or 4 units 3.982 2.409 
Percent of structures with 5 to 9 units 4.342 2.178 
Percent of structures with 10 to 19 units 3.782 2.575 
Percent of structures with 20 or more units 5.676 5.907 
Percent of units with 1 room 1.683 1.705 
Percent of units with 2 rooms 2.065 1.482 
Percent of units with 3 rooms 7.511 3.403 
Percent of units with 4 rooms 15.65 3.958 
Percent of units with 5 rooms 20.72 4.612 
Percent of units with 6 rooms 18.76 3.388 
Percent of units with 7 rooms 12.92 2.576 
Percent of units with 8 rooms 9.072 2.773 
Percent of units occupied by owner 67.00 8.998 
Percent of units with no vehicles 7.075 5.176 
Percent of units with one vehicle 32.72 5.488 
Percent of units with two vehicles 38.80 4.779 
Percent of units with no telephone 2.569 1.380 
Percent of units with mortgage 64.52 8.797 
Monthly cost for units with mortgage 1,472 439.6 
Percent of structures built after 1980 47.68 16.99 
Total population 327,870 575,999 
Percent of male population 49.23 1.204 
Median Age 38.20 4.599 
Percent of white population 81.59 14.57 
Percent of Hispanic or Latino 11.16 13.05 
Median household income 80,995 18,278 
Observations 3,250 3,250 








Table C. 2: Robust estimates for regression of home value using limited sample 
with cluster at county level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS FE RE 
HHI -4.838*** -2.287*** -4.555*** 
 (1.102) (0.804) (0.858) 
Observations 1,591 1,591 1,591 
R-squared 0.898 0.437  
Number of counties  669 669 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the county are in 
parentheses. 







Table C. 3: Estimates for regression of home value with 
county-specific time trends 
 (1) 
























Table C. 4: Estimates for regression of Gini coefficient of home value using 
limited sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 NO 
CONTRL 
OLS FE RE 
HHI 0.0158 -0.0198* 0.0391** 0.0211* 
 (0.0169) (0.0114) (0.0160) (0.0117) 
Observations 1,627 1,591 1,591 1,591 
R-squared 0.013 0.725 0.218  
Number of counties   669 669 







Table C. 5: Heteroskedasticity-robust estimates for regression 
of Gini coefficient of home values clustered at county level 
using full sample 
 (1) (4) (5) 
 OLS FE RE 
HHI -0.0179 0.0392*** 0.0168 
 (0.0130) (0.0135) (0.0106) 
Observations 3,165 3,165 3,165 
R-squared 0.705 0.150  
Number of counties  819 819 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the 















Table C. 6: Robust estimates for regression of Gini coefficient of home 
values clustered at county level using limited sample 
 (1) (4) (5) 
 OLS FE RE 
HHI -0.0198 0.0391*** 0.0211* 
 (0.0145) (0.0137) (0.0110) 
Observations 1,591 1,591 1,591 
R-squared 0.725 0.218  
Number of counties  669 669 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by the county are in 







Table C. 7: Estimates for regression of Gini-coefficient with county-specific time 
trend 
 (1) 
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